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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
TITTMANN AND THE 'TIGER CAR:' COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF
MODERNITY IN HAITI, 1946-50
by
Sean Bloch
Florida International University, 2003
Miami, Florida
Professor James Sweet, Major Professor
The purpose of this project was to address the lack of scholarship on mid-twentieth
century Haitian history and illustrate its significance. It employs primary and
secondary sources in shaping a Gramscian historical narrative. Ideas of "everyday
resistance" and internal and external politics are also be of significance to this work.
In mid-twentieth century Haiti, the black-nationalist rhetoric of noirisme became
the dominant political ideology. Blackness was amorphous and its application to
politics was dependent upon class. In proclaiming blackness the average Haitian
was attacking the class schism that beleaguered the island. Yet for the elite
noirisme was a conduit to modernity and a useful tool for muting the division
between rich and poor. With the election of Dumarsais Estim6 in 1946, dialogue
between the U.S. government, the Haitian elite, and the masses, relative to
definitions of modernity played out within the new political reality of noirisme.
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Introduction
In a 1951 policy statement the United States government noted, "there are racial
complications in US-Haitian relations."I It is no coincidence that "racial
complications" were of primary concern in U.S. relations with the "Negro republic"2
after the overthrow of Haitian President Dumarsais Estim6, for they were central to
foreign relations during his tenure. His presidency, 1946-50, was the stage for the
victory of noirisme, which consisted in part of the belief that blacks were responsible
for the defense of Haitian autonomy.3 It was also the setting for reinvigorated
governmental resistance to U.S. hegemony after thirty years of post-occupation
administrative complaisance. This contestation of hegemony was rooted in a noiriste
rhetoric, which depicted the United States as a white oppressor that used money and
military force to further its imperial project. Therefore noiristes strove to free Haiti
from outside powers and place it under the control of blacks. In 1946 Estim6 was
elected president of Haiti running on a noiriste platform and became the first black
president in decades. 4 The Estim6 presidency was a reminder that the U.S. supported
racial schism between "black" and "mulatto" was subject to inversion. Aside from the
U.S. occupation, the Estim6 presidency was perhaps the most pronounced instance of
U.S.-Haitian conflict prior to Papa Doc (1957-71). It was also the period when
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1951 (Washington, DC, 1979), p.
1455 [Hereafter FR US].
Ibid.
David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race Colour and National Independence in Haiti (New
Brunswick, NJ, 1996), p. 258.
a The last black president prior to Estim6 was Vilbrun Guillaume Sam.
noirisme confronted the economic disparity of the island and its promises were put to
the test.
The hegemonic conflict between the United States, the Haitian government, and
the Haitian people is perhaps most apparent in their respective approaches to
modernity. From the U.S. perspective, as evidenced by individuals such as
Ambassador Harold Hilgard Tittmann, modernity in Haiti entailed the technophilic
embrace of "progress" under U.S. direction as well as racial "whitening." For the
United States progress in Haiti meant acquiescence to its Cold War agenda. This
involved better infrastructure and submissive governmental stability to ensure
hemispheric security or more properly hemispheric control. "Whitening" was also a
facet of modernity and progress because of American acceptance of a racial hierarchy
with whites at the apex. Thus, the "whiter" Haitians could become the more advanced
they would be, even as they would never be totally white and were therefore subject to
U.S. rule. Under Estime the Haitian elite challenged the U.S. mandate to define
modernity and progress. Estim6's conception of modernity entailed an acceptance of
capitalism and urbanism but was explicitly opposed to U.S. intervention in Haitian
governance. Estime refuted "whitening" through his embrace of noirisme. For Estim6
modernity meant urban development and a proud assertion of blackness. For the
underclass, peasants and workers, modernity was often conceived of as an affliction
rather than equated with progress. It was expressed in terms of a malicious "tiger car"
or locust-like government land appropriation programs. Like Estim6 the underclass
accepted noirisme rather than "whitening," but they did so mainly to attack the class
schism. The United States, the Haitian Government, and the Haitian people clashed
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over definitions of modernity, as well as who was empowered to define it, and their
struggle was played out primarily within the rhetoric of noirisme.
The term noirisme and its various derivations so prevalent in the opening of this
work is taken from the works of Jacqueline Lamartiniere and David Nicholls.5 They
used it to designate a uniquely Haitian political and social rhetoric tied to blackness.
Noirisme has been a facet of national identity throughout Haiti's history as an
independent nation. However, it came into institutional discourse by way of the
ethnological movement and negritude writings of post-occupation Haiti. Since then,
scholars such as Lamartiniere and Nicholls have explored its many nuances. It was a
black consciousness, which linked democracy and self-rule to the black masses of
Haiti. It adhered to a dichotomy between black and mulatto in which mulattos were
seen as partners of foreign interest antagonistic to the general populace. However,
noirisme was complicated by class. As it was an ideology concerned with the masses
in opposition to the elite, it could easily be construed as essentially Marxist. Indeed
many, even most, noiristes were socialists. However, a good number of them were
doggedly anti-red, Estim6 being an example. Thus, the uniting factor of noirisnhe was
blackness. Yet blackness in Haiti is not necessarily a simple matter either. A
phenotypicaly black person could be labeled a mulatto and vice versa depending on
their socio-economic position. The Haitian proverb "Mulat pov se neg, neg rich se
mulat" (a poor mulatto is black, a rich black is mulatto) describes the situation aptly.
Whether Haitians sought to be identified as mulatto or black was a matter of historical
Jacqueline Lamartinibre, Le noirisme: essai sur la negritude et son utilisation dans le contexte Haitieni
(New York, 1976) and David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier.
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contingence and was linked to dominant trends in science and literature. In the climate
of scientific racism Haitians in general sought to "redden" themselves and claim a
mulatto identity. "Reddening" was essentially equivalent to "whitening." However,
"whitening" was unacceptable in a nation forged in opposition to the whiteness, which
served as a justification for the slave system. Yet blackness was not a viable option
prior to the occupation because blackness was equated with degeneracy. Hence
Haitians tried to "redden" themselves to erase blackness because to do so did not
fundamentally contradict Haitian nation building. When the theories informing
scientific racism were refuted in literature and politics, Haitians claimed a black
identity.
Haiti was and still is a nation extremely conscious of its history. As Brenda
Gayle Plummer puts it "Haitians preserved a sense of historic grievance, receptivity to
a stylized political rhetoric, and a feeling of inclusion-whether enjoyed or regretted-in a
closed society." 6 For many noiristes as well as their opponents "Haitian history itself
came to have [an] immediacy...that Southern history still has for unreconstructed great-
great-grandsons of the Confederacy." 7 Noirisme looked inward and drew upon Haitian
history and its symbols for political and social ends. This appropriation of symbols
was and remains an important facet of Haitian history.
Symbolic discourse in Haiti was all the more important because of the nation's
extremely low literacy rate. In 1950 Haiti was 89.3 percent illiterate, the highest rate of
6 Brenda Gayle Plummer, Haiti and the United States: The Psychological Moment (Athens, GA, 1992),
p. 26.
Ibid.
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illiteracy in Latin America and the Caribbean by far.8 Even after the Duvalier regime
had ended in 1986, Haiti retained an 85 percent illiteracy rate.9 To this day, more than
half of Haiti's population is illiterate. The political and social discourse in newspapers
was for the consumption of the elite. The primary newspapers were written in French,
which was a language that the general populace of Haiti simply did not speak and
certainly did not read. From the occupation on, Haitian papers carried articles and
advertisements in English eliciting American hegemony and further divorcing them
from the common Haitian. Aside from the elite, the only people who engaged in
politics in a written form were the members of the undersized middle class. At best this
middle class constituted 6.7 percent of the populace and was in effect a part of the elite,
a position they consolidated under Estim6.10 As plutocratic as the Haitian elite had
proved themselves to be, the fact remained that with enough machetes the peasantry
could cut them down from their elevated position. One need only look as far back as
the dismemberment of President Sam in 1914 for an example of the peasantry's ability
to bring about change violently. Thus it was in the interest of the elite to adopt the
symbols of Haitian history, just as it was in the interest of the general population to
invoke the very same symbols for their purposes. For example, the elite of Haiti could
adopt Charlemagne Pdralte or Toussaint l'Ouverture as defenders of Haitian autonomy
against imperialism, just as the masses could adopt them as peasant freedom fighters.
' Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 10 h edition (Los Angeles, 1966), p.90. Guatemala had the next
highest illiteracy rate at 62.1 percent.
* Plummer, Haiti and the United States, p. 219.
Various sources place the elite at anywhere from 2 to 20 percent of the population. 20 percent is an
outrageous claim and 2 percent is unlikely. Most scholars and government and non-government agencies
place it between 5 and 10 percent. See for instance Magloire, Plummer, Dupuy, Nicholls, and Baguidy.
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They could be used to justify elite hegemony within Haiti in opposition to outside
forces and they could also be used to justify resistance to elite hegemony within Haiti.
This fairly convoluted symbolic battlefield was the essence of Haitian politics and
would bring Dumarsais Estim6 to power in 1946.11
Previous depictions of Haitian history have not explicitly examined Haiti under
Estim6. There are a few Haitian works about Estim6 that serve to underline his
importance as a symbol within Haitian politics and praise his memory, but they are
markedly hagiographic in tone. Many other works recognize the significance of the
period but treat it as part of a trajectory leading up to the Duvalier regime. Excluding
its treatment as a brief stop on the road to Papa Doc or as a period of benevolent black
rule (in the case of Haitian works), the Estim6 presidency remains a hole in Haitian
historiography. Even an otherwise excellent recent work on Haiti could claim "From
the beginning of the occupation to the ascent of Francois Duvalier, the United States
exerted enormous and unchallenged influence in Haiti." 3 The timeline of Haitian
history emphasizes the revolution, the occupation, and the Duvalier regime almost
exclusively, so the purpose here, if nothing else, is to add a new watermark to the
traditional outline. The Estim6 presidency undoubtedly served as a catalyst to the rise
of Francois Duvalier. In fact Duvalier's rise to power was in many ways contingent
' For an account of symbolic discourse in the Haitian religious context see Terry Rey, Our Lady of Class
Struggle: the Cult of the Virgin Maiy in Haiti (Trenton, NJ, 1999).
2 See Lucienne Estim6, Dumarsais Estimd: Dialogue avec mes souvenirs (Port-au-Prince, 2001), Joseph
Baguidy, Dynamique d'une revolution: 1946 a Haiti (Berne, Switzerland, 1972), Jean Magloire, Pour
defendre la mnemoire de I'llustre president Dumarsais Estimd (Port-au-Prince, 1957), and Paul
Deschanel, Hommage de la jeunesse intellectuelle dut Nord at president Dumarsais Estime (Port-au-
Prince, 1947).
13 Paul Farmer, Aids and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame (Berkeley, CA, 1992), p. 183.
[emphasis mine].
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upon Estim6. However, Estime also served to remind the United States that the "racial
complications" of the occupation had never disappeared and that Haiti was capable of
contesting U.S. hegemony. For it was under Estim6 that the relationship between race
and economics was put to the forefront of politics, forcing the United States to contend
with it not only at home but in its foreign relations as well. It was also under Estim6
that the divergent perspectives of the elite and the peasantry came to a head.
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The Roots of Noirisme
To understand race in the Haitian context and to trace the rise of U.S. hegemony
it is necessary to examine the historical background of mid-twentieth century Haiti. In
1522 the first slave rebellion in the Americas took place on the island of Hispaniola,
home to the modern countries of Haiti and the Dominican Republic.' 4 Indeed violent
resistance to oppression based on racial and economic division would continue to
characterize Haitian history. The slave system which made Saint Domingue the "pride
of the Antilles," was intimately connected to definitions of 'race.' The upper class
whites who controlled the plantation system, as well as the colonial administrators of
Saint Domingue were known as the grands blancs. The owners of the plantations
tended to be absentee landlords. Planters remained to oversee the operation of the slave
plantations. The more marginalized whites of the island were known as petits blancs.
They were comprised of lower and middle class whites who tended to involve
themselves with various facets of urban commerce. The affranchis were free people of
color, most of whom tended to engage in occupations similar to those of the petits
blancs. Not surprisingly, the petits blancs and the affranchis were often in conflict.
The racism of the slave system transferred over to the public sphere such that even
those affranchis in a superior economic position to the petits blancs were subject to a
racial hierarchy which placed them below anyone with white skin.
4 Harold Hoetink. " 'Race' and Color in the Caribbean" in Caribbean Contours ed. Sidney Mintz and
Sally Price (Baltimore, 1985), p. 59.
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The plantation economy was reliant upon the labor of black African slaves and
their descendants. These slaves were organized into atliers, or work groups. The
atlieis were comprised of slaves thought to be particularly suited to various tasks, who
were put to work accordingly. For instance the slaves considered to be the most robust
were organized into an atlier responsible for the heaviest labor. Children and pregnant
women were placed in a work group designated with less laborious tasks, such as
weeding. The head of the atliers was the commandeur, who was generally a slave.
Slaves were further divided between house and field slaves, with field slavery being the
more physically rigorous of the two. Field slavery, in the case of sugar production, was
also divided between field and factory. The head of the refinery was the maitre sucrier,
who was also generally a slave. The matre sucrier and commandeur were often in
conflict because their appointments could be interchanged. These divisions, based on
race and occupation, contributed to the maintenance of the plantation structure and the
circumscribed position of the slaves. This was necessary, in the eyes of the planters, to
maintain control. The divisions fixed in the slave system set a precedent for the future
governance of the island.
The colonial masters of Saint Domingue sat upon a precarious throne. The slave
population greatly outnumbered them. In order to reap the profits of the slave system,
the planters needed to maintain their position of dominance. This was achieved
through physical and mental torture and adherence to a racial hierarchy. Race and the
characteristics associated with it provided an ideological basis for the justification and
maintenance of the slave system beyond the economic. The characteristic that most
readily distinguished a slave from a planter was skin color. Division based upon skin
9
color also applied to the free black population of the island, which was not granted the
same freedoms as the white population. In this sense race became of greater
significance than class in economic disputes between blacks and whites. The elite of
Saint Domingue employed race as the central feature of their domination. In this they
were not unique; rather they maintained a tradition of racial hierarchies, which was
readily at their disposal.
As noted, in order to maintain dominance there had to be a mechanism of control.
Hegemony was that mechanism of control and is used here in an essentially Gramscian
scheme. Hegemony is control outside the bounds of direct state intervention achieved
primarily through the presentation of power and the perception of subjects that this
power is immutable. Antonio Gramsci is particularly applicable to this work because
he was especially concerned with symbolism and ideology as they related to class
interaction. Gramsci claimed that through hegemony the elite controlled "not only the
means of physical production but the means of symbolic production as well.""5 Control
of symbolic production is achieved through "ideological state apparatuses" which
secure the "active consent of subordinate groups to the social arrangements that
reproduce their subordination."'" Control of symbols allows the elite to define reality
and thus relegates resistance and the desire for freedom to the realm of the impossible.
This in turn leads people to accept their position in society and see the structures of
oppression as natural. This idea builds directly on Karl Marx's concept of "false
1 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT,
1985), p. 315.
6 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, Ct, 1990),
p. 73.
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consciousness." If the elite have the ability to manipulate the lower classes then the
lower classes must be successfully deceived, making them "falsely conscious." In the
Gramscian scheme liberation from mental slavery is achieved when a Leninist
intelligentsia sheds false consciousness and rises from the people to take control of the
means of symbolic production. For Gramsci the Leninist intelligentsia is most likely to
be born out of "organic intellectuals." "These organic intellectuals are distinguished
less by their profession, which may be any job characteristic of their class, than by their
function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically
belong."' 7
Organic intellectuals are enabled to mediate class antagonism because "a
hegemonic ideology must, by definition, represent an idealization, which therefore
inevitably creates the contradictions that permit it to be criticized in its own terms."1 8
In other words, any given hegemonic ideology contains the seeds of its own
destruction. In criticism of Gramsci, James Scott claims that liberation from hegemony
is not achieved through the auspices of an intelligentsia but through "everyday
resistance." This "everyday resistance" ranges from symbolism in music and folklore
to work slow downs. "Everyday resistance" is the means by which the peasantry en
masse, rather than an intelligentsia, engages in dialogue with the elite. This dialogue in
turn informs hegemony, which is therefore rendered amorphous. It then stands to
reason that through hegemonic dialogue it is possible for the oppressed to liberate
Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London, 1971), Translated and edited by
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, p. 3.
James Scott, Weapons of the Weak, p. 317.
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themselves without the aid of an intelligentsia. While Scott claims to "stand Gramsci's
analysis of hegemony upside down...,"1 9 he essentially just expands on Gramsci's
concept of organic intellectuals. That is, for Scott there need no longer be a vanguard
of the underclass to lead it towards freedom because "'falsely conscious' subjects are
quite capable, it seems, of taking revolutionary action."2 The implication of course is
that the underclass is not falsely conscious. The primary conflict in the theories of
Gramsci and Scott is that for Gramsci "all men are intellectuals...but not all men have
in society the function of intellectuals" 2' whereas for Scott "all men are intellectuals."
As such, Scott does more to expand upon Gramscian analysis than to invert it and is
useful for that reason. The abstract principles thus presented are particularly interesting
when applied to Haiti.
While overt resistance tends to be stressed in Haitian history, with good reason,
the election of Estime can be considered the culmination of "everyday resistance."
That is, the fact that the president of Haiti would have to be black in 1946 was not a
function of elite mechanisms of control but a reaction to them. It was because the
peasantry in concert with students and social organizations professed a noiriste doctrine
and supported it through demonstrations and unrest that the so called "revolution of
1946" was a given. The agency accorded the general population of Haiti in bringing
about the "revolution of 1946" was based upon their ability to transform "everyday
resistance" into outright rebellion. The people were not led through their troubles by
19 James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 90.
20 Ibid., p. 78.
21 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 9.
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great men but rather created great men as symbols to aid them in overcoming their
plight. An example of this is the Haitian revolution. If the slaves of Saint Domingue
had simply to rely upon Toussaint l'Ouverture's abilities as a leader they would likely
have failed in liberating themselves from slavery. Toussaint l'Ouverture is
remembered as a great man not because he organized slaves towards their freedom but
because their own achievements can be neatly symbolized in the person of Toussaint.
The Haitians who liberated themselves from slavery through revolution conceived
of their struggle in terms of race as illustrated by Jean-Jacques Dessalines:
The whites from France cannot hold out against us here in Saint Domingue... when the
French are reduced to small, small numbers, we will harass them and beat them; we
will burn the harvests and then take to the hills. They will be forced to leave. Then I
will make you independent. There will be no more whites amongst us.
The slave system had been so racialized that independence was equated with the
elimination of whites. In expunging whiteness, the roughly five-hundred Poles and the
small contingent of Germans who had aided the Haitians in the revolution and remained
on the island were initially defined as black though they were phenotypicly white. 3
After the death assassination of Dessalines in 1806, their descendants became mulattos
in the eyes of the general populace. Independence was achieved in 1804 making Haiti
the first and only slave society to liberate itself "from below." It existed as something
of a proud anachronism. Haiti's successful revolution was the seed of "terrified
consciousness," or the recognition that the imperial hold on slave societies was subject
12 Quoted in Carolyn Fick, The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below
(Knoxville, TN, 1990), p. 212.
23 David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, p. 265.
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to the possibility of overthrow from within. Terrified consciousness fueled the non-
recognition of Haitian independence on the diplomatic front. Planters throughout the
Americas recognized that Saint Domingue was not the only island where the whip
could be repaid through revolution. In 1826 U.S. Senator Thomas Hart Benton gave
voice to such fears with "'we receive no mulatto consuls or black ambassadors from
[Haiti]. And why? The peace of eleven states will not permit the fruits of a successful
Negro insurrection to be exhibited among them.'" 25
While slave societies feared the example of Haiti, the people of the nation took
great pride in their history. This pride was tied to race and nourished both the noirisme
and the schism between black and mulatto, which characterized subsequent Haitian
history. Though freedom and autonomy were tenuous, Haitians held to them dearly.
An antagonistic relationship between the elite and the general population served to
stifle the freedom Haitians had fought for in the revolution. An example of the
opposition of black and mulatto is clear in the division of post-revolutionary Haiti into
two kingdoms. The Northern half of Haiti was a black kingdom under Henry
Christophe and the Southern half was a republic under mulatto Alexandre P6tion. The
division between black and mulatto was not simply a matter of ideology but a
foundation for tangible and enduring division within Haiti as well. Therefore race and
the characteristics associated with it had a powerful resonance for the average Haitian.
Even after Jean-Pierre Boyer ostensibly reunited Haiti in 1820 "The ever present colour
24 Franklin Knight, "The Haitian Revolution," American Historical Review, vol. 105, (Feb. 2000),
p. 1 13.
25 Quoted in Elizabeth Abbott, Haiti: An Insider's Historv of the Rise and Fall of the Duvaliers (New
York, 1991), p. 18.
14
question ... served to divide Haitians into hostile groups and gave politicians a stick
with which to beat their opponents."26
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Germans, French, and
Americans attempted to intervene in the political and economic affairs of Haiti,
threatening the country's sovereignty. But the most explicit challenge to Haitian
autonomy came in the form of United States marines landing on the island in 1915.
The U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915-34 had a profound impact on the worldview
and social structure of Haiti. One consequence of the occupation was the restructuring
of the Haitian concept of race. "'Color' or 'race'... is a function of existing modes of
perception that are themselves a historical and cultural product, not a genetic
actuality."2 7 In post-revolutionary Haiti and up to the occupation, the perception of
race, though nebulous, was essentially a dichotomy of opposition between black and
mulatto.
Race was also of political and social significance in the United States. However,
U.S. constructions of race were different from those of Haitians. For Americans race
was a matter of black and white. During the occupation American conceptions of race
were imposed on the Haitian dichotomy. The meeting of Haitian and American
perceptions of race necessitated their transmutation. This perhaps oversimplifies the
complexities of American and Haitian conceptions of race but it serves to illustrate their
significance. Race is employed here in order to elucidate the connections between
racial constructions and imperial politics. As noted, Haitians and Americans had
' David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier. p. 14
27 Sidney Mintz, Caribbean Transformations ( New York, 1989), p. 315.
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constructed racial orders that were tied to identity and politics and the occupation
catalyzed a re-evaluation of these orders.
One example of the significance of race in U.S.-Haitian relations can be seen in
the imperial contest between Germany and the United States. By 1914 the Germans
had established a permanent colony within the nation of Haiti. Some Germans married
Haitian women in order to get around laws prohibiting foreign ownership of land. In
1912 a German school was opened in Port-au-Prince in order to "'Germanize the
descendants of Germans established in Haiti."' 28 Germans controlled eighty percent of
Haitian commerce in 1914.2 Germany was also "not averse to sending warships to
collect unpaid debts."3 0 The Germans were quite willing to engage in gunboat
diplomacy. Thus, Germany had a good grounding to establish itself as the primary
foreign power in Haiti. However, the United States was also attempting to exert its
influence on the island. It should be noted that France and Britain also showed an
active interest in subordinating Haiti. France in particular had many economic,
cultural, and historical links to Haiti to aid them in their neo-colonial project. Yet just
prior to the occupation the United States and Germany were in the best position to exert
influence over Haiti. As Hans Schmidt explains "Germany, as a nascent and aggressive
imperial power, was considered by the United States as its chief rival in the
28 Quoted in Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, NJ,
1971), p. 3 4 .
29 /bid., p. 35.
'u James Fergusson, A Traveller's History of the Caribbean (New York, 1999), p. 214.
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Caribbean."3 1 This contested influence placed the United States in direct opposition to
Germany.
Yet even in the most derisive U.S. government documents the Germans were
simply referred to as "German." The Germans living in Haiti were considered viable
opponents. The U.S. despised their attempts to assert themselves in the economic and
political fields of Haiti and depicted them as the real power behind Haitian resistance to
U.S. encroachment. While the U.S. occupation was not driven wholly by conceptions
of race, racist paternalism was the justification for it. Economics were certainly a
central issue in the occupation and were the primary reason that the United States took
an interest in Haiti. However, the reason that American officials considered the Haitian
economy unstable was because they viewed Haitians as depraved and ignorant. The
U.S. sought to make it impossible for the finances of Haiti "to be considered and
counted on as security for loans made by those who consider the financing of a
revolution a legitimate business enterprise."3 The quote refers to Germans who were
believed to have been profiting from political unrest. An American official described
the mechanics of this process in:
Revolutionary movements were financed by foreigners who, when approached by a
leader of an incipient movement, would agree to lend funds and would buy so-called
'revolutionary bonds' at perhaps ten cents on the dollar, with the understanding that if
the revolution was brought to a successful conclusion, the bonds would be redeemed.33
" Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, p. 34.
32 Ibid., p. 320.
3 John Allen quoted in Robert and Nancy Heinl, Written in Blood: the Story ofthe Haitian People 1492-
1995 (Lanham, MD, 1996), p. 338.
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In order to achieve economic balance the United States needed to impose "stability" in
a place they held to be unstable because of its black population and the Germans they
believed to control it. The occupation was a battle with Germany for hegemony,
within which Haitians were regarded as little more than pawns.
References to Haitians in U.S. government documents demonstrate the venomous
characterizations used to justify intervention. Secretary of Legation Beale Davis
referred to Haitians in a memo to the Secretary of State variously as "half-starved
natives," "utterly ignorant," and "armed rabble" which was capable of becoming "mad
from the sight of blood."34 The context for this description was the dismemberment of
the president of Haiti by a mob of Haitian citizens. This incident was the impetus for
the occupation of the island. Perhaps Davis's shock at the immolation of President Sam
is understandable. Yet his concerns after the incident present a classist and racist
perspective typical of U.S. officials and military personnel at the time. He states:
Following the American intervention, and as soon as the ignorant classes found that
they were not to be made slaves and their lands confiscated as the politicians, seeing in
foreign intervention an end of the conditions which had permitted their exploitation of
the country for personal gain, had taught them to believe, conditions rapidly began to
improve.35
Here Davis offers a detached and paternalistic view of Haitian politics. He imparts
recognition of the schism between blacks and mulattos and suggests that the mulatto
elite had fooled the "ignorant classes" into believing that the U.S. sought to make them
slaves and take their land. He then slates the occupation as benevolent such that after
Haitians realized the United States was not there to enslave them the situation was
4 R.B. Davis, FRUS: 1916, p. 318.
Ibid., p.319.
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ameliorated. This ignores the fact that Haitians did connect labor forced on them by
U.S. marines with slavery and many became Cacos rebels in order to fight the United
States. Further, the Cacos were primarily composed of the peasantry, or "ignorant
classes." At the ground level, where Haitians and marines interacted, American
marines "insisted on treating all Haitians of whatever colour as 'niggers."' 36
American conceptions of race served as a rationalization for intercession in Haiti.
If Haitians were simply "utterly ignorant," "half-starved natives" based on their black
skin, then U.S. intervention could be slated as a benevolent undertaking with the goal of
restoring order. Rather than allow Haitians to remain "mad from the sight of blood" the
U.S. government would "aid the Haitian people to free themselves from the hopeless
conditions which continued revolution and a policy of despotic militarism had
produced." 37 Such rhetoric was common in the climate of the "white man's burden."
Intrinsic to the "white man's burden," which took its name from a Rudyard Kipling
poem, was a pro-imperialist call to arms favorable of "civilizing" dark skinned peoples
who were considered inferior to light skinned peoples. Ostensibly the United States
sought to restore order to Haiti through the occupation. However, the American
conception of the root of Haitian disorder was based on racism. Because Haitians were
"utterly ignorant," "blood maddened," "half-starved natives" disorder was their natural
state of existence. It was therefore the American duty to take up the "white man's
burden" and "civilize" the supposedly depraved Haitian people.
36 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier. p. 142.
3 Davis, FRUS: 1916, p. 319.
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The Appropriation of Blackness
The U.S. occupation and its racial constructions recast Haitian identity.
Mulattos who had been at the apex of the Haitian racial hierarchy were labeled as black
and responded with the assertion of black unity. "The Americans unintentionally
succeeded where Dessalines had failed, in uniting all Haitians under the name
'black."' 38 One aspect of this new black identity was the ethnological movement,
founded by Justin Chrysostome Dorsainvil, Dr. Arthur Holly, and Dr. Jean Price-Mars.
They stressed that the road to a new black identity would take the form of education,
religion, and language. The road would also have to originate in Africa. The
ethnological movement maintained that "...it is impossible to penetrate the mentality of
the Haitian people without a profound study of their African origins."3 9 Hence
education had to stress Africa; Vodou was favored in the realm of religion; and Creole
in the realm of language. Haitians were critical of American education programs,
which they considered too technical and materialistic. Through the efforts of the
Minister of Public Instruction, Dantes Bellegarde, "Haitian students began to learn
history not so much from French and European traditions, but rather from an African
perspective."40 Arthur Holly and Jean Price-Mars were critical of Vodou as a religion
but appreciated it as a resonance of African culture. The ethnological movement
' Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier. p. 142.
3 Ibid., p. 143.
" Leon Pamphile, Haitians and African Americans: A Heritage of Tragedy and Hope (Gainesville, FL,
2001), p. 109.
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considered Creole an intrinsically valuable language rather than as a mark of
ignorance.4 '
However, the ethnological movement, in a sense, denied the very things it
sought to proclaim. The African past of Haiti was either stressed for its Western
components or forced into a Western mold. Price-Mars, for instance, relied upon
ethnological and anthropological works emanating from the French academy in
formulating his vision of Africa. These works embraced a euro-centric hierarchy of
"civilization" and stressed similarities between African and Western traditions to
impart the potential of Africans for "civilization" while at the same time underlining
their "primitive" nature.43 Though, Price-Mars had little to choose from as far as
academic sources on Africa, he prefigured Estim6 in his embrace of "progress" linked
with noirisme. The study of Africa on its own terms was not embraced and it remained
a dark continent of drums and dancing even as these were now ostensibly respected
(provided they could be paralleled with Western practices).
The ethnological movement influenced negritude. This was a literary
movement that stressed a unique black spirituality. Thus, blacks were considered a
distinctive race with a unique spiritual heritage. Like the ethnological movement,
negritude also emphasized African roots. Also like the ethnological movement, these
African roots were imagined from a Western perspective and rarely distinguished
4 See Leon-Francois Hoffman, Haiti: couleurs, crovances, crdole (Port-au-Prince, 1990).
42 Magdaline Shannon, Jean Price-Mars, the Haitian Elite and the American Occupation, 19 15-35 (New
York, 1996), p. 63, 75-76.
4 See for instance Joseph Deniker, Les Races et les peoples de la terre: elements d 'anthropologie et
d'ethnographie (Paris, 1926), Alexandre Le Roy, La religion des primitives (Paris, 1909), and Maurice
Delafosse, Les noirs de I'Afrique (Paris, 1922).
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between the myriad cultures of Africa. At best negritude unified blacks, provided a
rich and self-affirming literature, and asserted a proud identity in the face of the
occupation. At worst it simply endorsed the racialized divisions imported during the
occupation. Within the reaction to the occupation expressed in the ethnological
movement and negritude, the elite of Haiti were enabled to appropriate blackness while
maintaining the same divisions that had plagued Haiti throughout its history. In the
socio-political realm "the ethnological movement in particular contributed to a
reinvigorated noiriste ideology, in which the black legendary view of the past was
enforced by the new racialism of negritude."4 4
A similar appropriation of blackness was underway in the United States and the
meeting of the two further illustrates the nature of the Haitian version. The Universal
Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) was active in Haiti, and at a 1920 New York
convention the Haitian delegate invoked race and "spoke of the revolutions instigated
in that country by white men." 45 Speaking of the Haitian people and soliciting the aid
of American blacks, he went on to state "actual independence they do not have, but
they hoped to posses it ... with God's help and the aid of black people from this
country and other parts of the world." 46 The UNIA was not the social and economic
force in Port-au-Prince that it was in Harlem and its Haitian activity remained
4 4 Ibid, p. 163.
U Robert Hill ed., The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers (Los
Angeles, 1983), v. 2, p. 531.
46 Ibid.
22
essentially intellectual. 7 The primary aid, if it can be characterized as such, that the
UNIA accorded Haiti came in the form of Garvey's relatively frequent reference to the
island and its symbols in his speeches. Alternating between third and first person
Garvey stated "...the only regret Marcus Garvey has now [is] that he was not born in
the days of slavery, when he would have taken up the sword like Toussaint l'Ouverture
to free myself out of a slavery that I did not bring upon myself."4 He always depicted
l'Ouverture as the driving force behind the revolution and claimed him for the UNIA as
a symbol of eventual triumph. Garvey had a reverence for Toussaint l'Ouverture that
he denied Haitians in general. In a 1924 speech Garvey stated:
Because Haiti, little Haiti, has had her little political troubles...our army and navy
proceeds to invade the little country and [est]ablish jurisdiction over it. But [Fr]ance,
which troubles the peace of the [wo]rld, is allowed to do as she pleases. [Ho]w?
Because France represents pow[er.] France represents strength, while [Hai]ti represents
nothing.49
Although he laments the occupation, the underlying message is an admonition of Haiti
for not being stronger. However, it is unlikely that Haitian members of the UNIA
would have been particularly disturbed by this speech. This is because Garvey
compares Haiti to France and within Haiti the UNIA was comprised of the elite. In an
interview with the New York Sun, the Haitian minister "corroborated the attitude" of a
4 For the social and economic aspects of UNIA activities within the United States see Irma Watkins-
Owens. Blood Relations: Caribbean Immigrants and the Harlem Community, 1900-1930 (Indianapolis,
1996), and Winston James, Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia: Caribbean Radicalism in Early
Twentieth-Century America (New York, 1999).
4 Robert Hill ed., The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers (Los
Angeles, 1986), v. 5, p. 140.
4 Ibid., p. 529.
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Mr. Candice, from Guadalupe, that "'I am black, but I am French first."' 5 0 Candice
was responding to Garvey's Afro-centrism from the standpoint of a Francophile. In so
doing he was also giving voice to the opinion of the Haitian elite.
The occupation had not fundamentally altered the American perspective on race.
All Haitians were still considered black and therefore inferior. However, the United
States recognized that race was tied to class in Haiti and that mulattos were traditionally
better off financially than blacks and more favorable to U.S. interests. In order to
stabilize the position of the mulatto elite and thereby secure hegemony, the U.S.
completely reorganized the Haitian military. The gendarmerie, renamed the Garde d'
Haiti in 1928, was centralized, weakened, and subordinated to the Haitian government.
This served to stabilize Haitian - Dominican relations, or rather to better the U.S.
position in both nations. It also allowed for a more predictable political climate, which
was a facet of the stability necessary for U.S. hegemony. The fact that the Garde d'
Haiti did not force conscription had the result of its being comprised chiefly of pro-
American Haitians. Even after the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1934, the Garde d'
Haiti could be described in these terms: "its spirit, morale, and military training are
American." 5 1 The occupation of Haiti by thousands of U.S. marines had an indelible
effect on the island. This was expressed in an altered infrastructure, military, and, most
significantly, Haitian worldview.
50 Robert Hill ed., The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers (Los
Angeles, 1985), v. 4, p. 32.
s' Petrus Calixte, Haiti: The Calvary of a Soldier (New York, 1976), p. 29.
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Immediately following the occupation, the "stability" and "democracy"
necessary for U.S. hegemony appeared to be firmly in place. In practice, "stability"
and "democracy" amounted to mulatto dictatorships, which were characterized by
greed and American accommodation. U.S. hegemony appeared to be firmly
established. The United States simply needed a favorable Haitian president in office
before it could fully withdraw the occupation forces. They found such a man in Stenio
Vincent. President Vincent actually came to power on a nationalist platform, which
opposed the occupation. Vincent was, however, quite favorable to U.S. investment and
business ventures in Haiti. Vincent was also highly suspicious of blacks and
particularly those blacks enlisted in the Haitian military. In fact, Vincent maintained a
private security force, a tactic that Duvalier would later employ with the Tonton
Macouts. The subordination of the new Haitian military, as well as Vincent's disregard
for black Haitians, was demonstrated in 1937. Haitian cane cutters who had been
expelled from Cuba sought work in the Dominican Republic. Within Cuba, Haitians,
along with other Antillean laborers, became the foil of nationalist politics. "Amid
rising unemployment and social turmoil, the immigrants became a visible target for the
nationalists' desire to alleviate the situation of native workers."52 Within the
Dominican Republic they were accused of banditry, cattle-theft and were generally
despised. Haitian national identity was equated with blackness. Dominican national
identity focused on the denial of blackness. The presence of thousands of black cane
cutters in the Dominican Republic was therefore problematic for Dominicans. Rafael
52 Alejandro De La Fuente, A Nation For All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Centurv Cuba
(Chapel Hill, NC, 2001), p. 103.
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Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, addressed the "Haitian problem" with
brutal force. "Trujillo's antidote was to begin bloodletting, and the rivers of blood that
flowed were Haitian."5 3 Estimates of the death toll range from 10,000 to 30,000. In
any case, the incident was one of extreme brutality. The Haitian military was unable to
retaliate and the Haitian government accepted a monetary concession.
The Vincent administration ended in 1941, and Elie Lescot gained the Haitian
presidency. Lescot continued Haitian accommodation to U.S. hegemony. In fact,
Lescot declared war on the Axis powers five hours before the United States.5 Haitians
saw Lescot as a successor to Vincent. An American newspaper article captures their
reaction to his "election:" " Riots occurred last week when large crowds demonstrated
at the Congress building...in protest against the Lescot candidacy, which was said to
have been supported by Vincent."5 5 Regardless of popular disaffection, Lescot
supported a number of American development programs. He granted land for sisal
cultivation to the Societe Ha'tiane-Americaine Development Agricole (SHADA), which
the U.S.-controlled Import-Export bank funded. SHADA had a predominantly
American administration and tended to fund programs to produce goods to be
consumed in the United States. The land given to SHADA in order to provide the
United States with sisal products was taken from peasants, who were subsequently
displaced. Sisal itself was a hemp substitute used to mainly for rope. Lescot also
supported the Cryptostegia project to produce rubber for the war effort. The
3 Abbott, Haiti: An Insider 's History p. 49.
s Ibid, p. 53.
s "Lescot Minister to U.S., Voted Haitian President," Crumbie Papers. MS Group 14.
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Cryptostegia project, which took its name from a tree believed to yield cheap rubber
failed to produce a significant amount of quality product. An American newspaper
observed that "the cryptostegia experiments had become such a by-word for failure the
newly-formed Communist party was using them for anti-Yankee propaganda."56 These
programs, which enriched the Lescot administration at the expense of the Haitian
people, would become a particular bone of contention during the Estim6
administration. 57 In the cultural realm Lescot launched an "anti-superstition" campaign
to repress Vodou and introduced laws defining acceptable cultural practices. This
entailed the confiscation and burning of drums and ritual paraphernalia and criminal
codes against Vodou.
Haitians hostility to the policies of Lescot and widespread anti-Lescot sentiment
resulted in protests and strikes. In the United States the unrest within Haiti was
watched with concern. From the U.S. perspective "the 'Black Republic' of Haiti faced
a future even darker than her three million people (95% pure Negro)" because "bottom-
dog conditions on U.S. Caribbean doorstep were piling up unrest, fertilizing soil for
Red propaganda."5 8 Americans linked the noirisme driving popular agitation for
elections directly to communism. In connecting race to the communist party the United
States press was actually promoting the symbolic discourse of the peasantry, though
their purpose was quite the opposite. The Communist party as an official body within
Haiti was predominantly comprised of elite liberal mulattos. The most notable of these
5' "Black Soil for Reds," Pathfinder, 27 February 1946.
' Charles Hauch Memorandum of Conversation, FR US: 1946, p. 734.
"Black Soil for Reds," Pathfinder, 27 February 1946.
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was Jacques Roumain who founded the Haitian Communist Party in 1934.5'
Communism was attractive to liberal mulattos because it attacked the racism of
noirisme. Roumain "claimed that the colour problem in Haiti was of exceptional
importance because it was the means whereby politicians, both black and mulatto, were
able to divert attention from the class struggle."60 Communism was also enticing
because "false consciousness" justified the current position of the masses, and their
liberation was in the hands of the Haitian Intelligentsia, a title members of the party
could claim. The communism of Francophile Haitians, who gleaned their theories
through dense books and African-American newspaper articles, was actually in
opposition to the socialism of the masses. The peasantry did not conceive of the class
struggle in the same way that the elite did. While the elite either claimed noirisme as
their own or lamented it as a diversion from the issue of class, the masses employed
race as their primary weapon against oppression. Hence the communist party within
Haiti was opposed to noirisme, while the peasantry adopted it as the means to condemn,
among other things, the class schism. Ultimately, the disquiet throughout Haiti
culminated in a military overthrow of the Lescot government on 7 January 1946.6
U.S. hegemony was manifest in the Haitian elite adoption of organizations like
the UNIA and the Communist party. The elite recognized the tension between African-
Americans and the state. They also understood the leveling agenda of communism in
the U.S. even as they feared it at home. That the Haitian elite adopted the movements
5 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier. p. 173.
60 Ibid.
61 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier. p. 184.
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of the American underclass points to their position vis-a-vis the United States. The
ways in which they adopted these movements also points to their recognition of their
position in relation to the masses. That is, the Haitian elite appropriated blackness in
order to combat U.S. hegemony at the same time that they used it to secure their own.
The elite were not completely united in their approach to the problem of opposing U.S.
hegemony while maintaining theirs. Conservatives, like Lescot, for the most part
accepted U.S. dominance and sought to maintain control in Haiti through direct
coercion. Liberals, like Roumain, adopted communism to mute race and claim their
mandate as a benevolent intelligentsia. Noiristes like Estim6 adopted black nationalism
in order to legitimize their modernizing project while distancing themselves from the
cold war. By 1946, the Haitian people were most sympathetic to the noirisme espoused
by Estim6. In the sense that none of the elite approaches to modernity was particularly
favorable to the masses, the support that the masses accorded Estim was simply the
most in line with their own agenda. Within the rhetoric of noirisme, which Estim6 had
connected himself to, there was space to contest the iniquity of the elite. Ultimately,
the disquiet throughout Haiti culminated in a military overthrow of the Lescot
government on 7 January 1946.
62 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier. p. 184.
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"The Revolution of 1946"
1946 saw the victory of noirisme in the political sphere. A political coalition of
various radical groups under the collective of Front Revolutionaire HaYtien (FRH)
formed to agitate for elections.6 3 The primary concern of the FRH was the election of a
black president. "These groups were in general agreement that some radical changes
were needed in the country and that these could be carried out only by an authentic
representative of the people, that is by a black president."6 4 Estim6 recognized the
importance of race in the election and ran on the slogan "A black man in power."
Petrus Calixte also campaigned for the black vote and drew his support primarily from
Port-au-Prince and the Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan (MOP). Colonel Petrus Calixte was
a black Haitian who rose in the ranks of the Garde d' Haiti. His high rank in the
military coupled with his race had earned him the distrust of President Vincent. In the
late 1930s he was accused of plotting to overthrow President Vincent and sought exile
in the United States.66 Calixte returned to Haiti to run on a noiriste platform as
Estim6's primary opposition. MOP was a noiriste party founded by Daniel Fignol6 in
1946. "Fignole was proud of his charismatic following among the urban poor of Port-
au-Prince and called their massed power the 'steamroller.' 6 7 With the steamroller in
63 Ibid.
6 4 Ibid, p. 185.
65 Abbott, Haiti: An Insider's History. p. 56.
66 Petrus Calixte, Haiti: The Cavahy of a Soldier, p. 127.
67 Plummer, Haiti and the United States, p. 149.
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motion, elections were imminent. Juste Constant ran on a communist platform,
representing the liberal wing of the mulatto elite. The more conservative elements of
the mulatto elite backed Edgar Numa, a black man. Numa professed an adherence to
noirisme but was considered a puppet of the mulatto elite.68 Estim6 drew his support
from the peasantry concentrated in the Artibonite Valley and the North, as well as the
very small middle class. Because he was the primary noiriste candidate from the North
he enjoyed the support of a large segment of the peasantry, and because he was a
moderate he had the urban middle class in his corner. He planned to liberate Haiti from
U.S. domination, legislate greater freedoms and embrace modernization as the panacea
to the plight of workers and the peasantry. On August 16, 1946 Dumarsais Estim6 was
elected President of Haiti.69 The opposition between mulatto and black had been
successfully manipulated to bring Estim6 to power. Thus, the Haitian government
established after the occupation, once so favorable to U.S. interests, had been inverted.
The old mulatto elite was moved from the throne to the court of Haitian governance.
The United States no longer had a stable middleman in their relations with Haiti, hence
the renewed concern with "racial complications."
Within Haiti the peasantry could celebrate its success in helping bring a black
man to power. However, many were initially disappointed that the revolution of 1946
had resulted in a moderate's ascension to power, particularly the urban poor at the helm
68 Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race, and Underdevelopment since 1700 (London,
1989), p. 150. The practice of mulattos running a black for office while retaining control of the
government was known as politique de doublure.
69 Ambassador Tittmann to Secretary of State, FR US: 1946, p. 937.
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of the "steamroller." Estim6 recognized that in order to stop the steamroller he needed
Fignol6. Estime wanted to stop the steamroller because although he embraced noirisme
he also embraced capitalism and feared communism as much as the U.S. imperialists he
often fought against. Therefore he appointed Fignol6 to his cabinet as minister of
education. This tactic worked and "Fignol6's acceptance of this deal simultaneously
weakened him as an urban leader and sacrificed his following to the new president." 70
Because Fignol6 was willing to give Estim6 the benefit of the doubt, his following was
willing to put their faith in Estim6. As a concession to the mulatto elite Estim6
appointed Georges Riguad minister of commerce. However, he was unable to co-opt
Rigaud's following who had remained vocal critics of his administration. The Mulatto
elite, who had been divorced from government dominance with the election of 1946,
criticized Estim6 primarily for his economic policies and his acceptance of noirisme.
Since the occupation the mulatto elite had found alliance with U.S. interests lucrative.
The autonomy Estim6 proposed was in conflict with U.S. interests, so the old guard
generally considered him imprudent. The liberals who followed Rigaud felt that Estim6
was avoiding the class issue through his espousal of noirisme.
Estim6 addressed opposition from liberal mulattos directly. In March of 1947
he managed to pass an anti-communist law.71 This was perhaps the one redemptive
aspect of his administration in the eyes of the United States. He would later use his
opposition to communism as a means to secure U.S. aid for a slum clearing project in
Port-au-Prince. Academics commenting on Estim6 have often seen him as something
7 Plummer, Haiti and the United States, p. 150.
7 Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the World Economy (London, 1989), p. 151.
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of a traitor because they have held to a stringent interpretation of Marxism. For many,
any move against communism was believed a move against the people. But
considering that communism was more complex in Haiti, Estim6's policies towards it
are complicated. The popular noiriste organizations, while essentially socialist, tended
to characterize themselves as leftists specifically to avoid portrayal as red behind the
western front of the cold war. Within Haiti, the Communist party was an elite
organization and can be distinguished from its American counterpart in much the same
way as the UNIA. This is not to posit Estim6 as an undercover socialist; he was
decidedly opposed to communism, but the implementation of the anti-communist law
was mainly a measure against the official communist party.
Regardless of his opposition to communism, Estim6 was seen as an obstacle to
continued U.S. hegemony. Estime intimated, in a conversation with American
ambassador Orme Wilson, that the U.S. purchase of Haitian goods during the war had
kept the island from economic disaster. Yet, he went on to state "the Haitian peasant
benefited relatively little by this trade, as the imports which were received from the
United States were distributed by the Lescot administration among its favorites, who
made scandalous profits on them." 72 Thus, Estim6 aligned himself both with the
peasants and against U.S. supported graft. The Haitian peasantry's recognition of and
opposition to U.S. hegemony and government corruption informed Estim6's political
stance. He, in fact, owed his office to the frustrations of the peasantry and was shrewd
enough to give credence to their concerns in order to cement his position.
72 Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State, FR US: 1946, p. 913.
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Yet Estim6's concern for the Haitian peasant may have been more than simply
political maneuvering. "Estime might well be considered a self-made member of the
elite, but he was not born into it, and his accession to power was the political
expression of new possibilities in Haitian life." 73 Estim6 was born in Verettes in the
Artibonite Valley of modest parentage. He attended public schools and became a
schoolteacher. He then secured the posts of Secretary of Education, Labor, and
Agriculture under the Vincent administration. Thus, he had been close to both the
underclass and the elite.7 4 Having seen Haiti from both sides of the fence helped to
form his prejudices. "Estim6 disliked white people and hated mulattoes with all the
bitterness of a disadvantaged black. Yet at the same time he had such a weakness for
mulatto women that the tan Oldsmobile he seduced them in was known as 'The Tomb
of Virgins.'" 7 5 Estim6 was of the underclass yet he favored the elite life. While it is
impossible to know his inner thoughts, it stands to reason that Estime may have felt
some guilt about his station in life and therefore had a genuine concern for improving
the lot of the peasant. Regardless of his impetus, the policy of the Estime
administration was focused on greater Haitian autonomy and better conditions for the
Haitian peasantry through modernization. He believed that through modernization he
could guide Haiti into the international market and that this would help to alleviate
poverty.
3 Sidney Mintz, Caribbean Transformations, p. 287.
7 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier. p. 186.
7 Abbott, Haiti: An Insider 's History. p. 57.
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Estim6's primary opposition within Haiti was also concerned with improving
the status of the Haitian peasantry. Emile St. Lot headed the Front Revolutionaire
Haitien, which had been instrumental in seeing to it that a black president was elected.
After the election of 1946, St. Lot became active within MOP. This served as the
primary base of more radical blacks. Though MOP's presidential candidate, Petrus
Calixte, had expressed his support for Estim6, after the election the majority of MOP
believed Estim6 to be too moderate in his policies. Race had taken the position of
primacy in the election of 1946, but class became the prime concern of many Haitians
after the election. Now that the schism between mulatto and black had been
ameliorated, the disparity between rich and poor needed to be dealt with. Where
Estim6 saw capitalism coupled with greater autonomy as the road to a better economy,
St. Lot favored socialism. Estim6 intimated to Ambassador Orme Wilson that "there
exists a group of radical minded persons, among whom he mentioned Emile St. Lot,
who call themselves leftists and wish to take drastic action against foreign capital." 76
Estime then related "that although, he too, could be called a revolutionary, and that
although it is his intention to endeavor to free the Haitian peasant from his present
condition of misery and squalor, he harbors absolutely no hostile feelings against
American capital."77 Thus, in the climate of the cold war Estim6 had aligned himself
with capitalism. However, Estim6 believed that Haiti had to be free from U.S.
hegemony to prosper. That is, Haiti desired to trade with and secure loans from the
United States but did not intend to grant Americans free reign over the island in return.
76 Wilson to Secretary of State, FR US: 1946, p. 913.
77 Ibid.
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When coupled with his black identity, he became as unpalatable to the United States as
St. Lot and the leftists.
Estim6 believed in maintaining trade with the United States while retaining
economic sovereignty. The Estim6 administration looked to Miami as a trading partner
within the United States. In March of 1947, a busy month for the administration,
Estim6 organized an exposition of Haitian goods in Miami. The response of Frederick
Hosea, a representative of the Mayor of Miami, was printed in Le Nouvelliste. Hosea
claimed "this small showroom can be the starting point of a large international market
where ourselves, other Americans, and our neighbors will be able to meet, to show our
products, to learn reciprocal understanding, and carry out business." 78 The volume of
trade increased dramatically, but Haitian imports continued to exceed exports by a
margin of one million dollars, a trend that had been fairly constant since 1938.79 Haiti
was dealing in more products but continued to be a buyer rather than a seller in the
international market.
Estim6's goal was to "build a modern country" and his plan for doing so was
outlined in an article in Le Nouvelliste. According to the article, Estim6 was working to
"rapidly transform the country into the most advanced in the Antilles."8 0 In pursuing
this goal, the Estime administration built schools and increased wages for teachers and
administrators. They also increased the minimum wage from thirty to seventy cents per
78 "Succes de /'exposition haitienne a Miami," Le Nouvelliste, 22 March 1947.
7 Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 10' edition (L.A., 1966), p. 138-139.
80 M.F. Dunbaugh, "Le nouveau President d 'HaTti travaille a edifer un pays moderne," Le Nouvelliste.
14 October 1948.
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day.8 1 Thus, Estim6 was responding to his prime constituents, workers and urban
professionals. In addressing the concerns of the peasantry, Estim6 built schools in
small towns and rural areas and worked with the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Through UNESCO, the Estim6 administration
implemented irrigation and sanitation programs. Clearly Estim6 was not averse to
outside collaboration; he was simply opposed to U.S. hegemony.
In order to reify the policies of modernization and in response to popular
demand, the Estim6 administration went about drafting a new Constitution in 1946.
The Constitution was the materialization of noirisme in legislation. It put strict
limitations on foreign businesses, though less so on the tourist industry, and equated
citizenship with blackness. It also protected freedom of the press, allowing an
opposition voice within the elite. When they presented the proposed Constitution, both
the U.S. and the Haitian elite protested it. Newspaper headlines read "The Constitution
of 1946 is Inadmissible" and "We Denounce Article 12 of the Constitution."82 Article
12 limited police powers and subordinated them more directly to the state. The United
States saw the autonomy that the 1946 Constitution endorsed as defiant and many of
the Haitian elite believed it financially suicidal. Some of the elite also considered it to
be a maneuver to further divorce them from power. At the ground level, the programs
that the Estim6 administration pushed did not necessarily meet with enthusiasm from
81 Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race, and Underdevelopment Since 1700 (London,
1989), p. 152.
82 Granville Auguste, "La Constitution de 1946 est inadmissible," Le Nouvelliste. 1 August 1946 and
Roger Charmant, "Autour de /'Article 12 de la constitution nous denoncons ," Le Nouvelliste. 4 March
1947 respectively.
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the peasantry who themselves sought a certain autonomy from the government. For
instance, rural markets were considered a hindrance to modernization because they
were believed to undermine the flow of capital into development programs. But for the
Haitian peasantry they were a manifestation of economic self-sufficiency. Haitian rural
culture was valued for its marketability to tourists. But for the Haitian peasantry it was
intrinsically valuable and lost meaning when commodified. Thus, the Haitian peasantry
was frequently at odds with the modernization that the Estim6 administration believed
to be the solution to Haiti's problems.
One contentious issue in the 1946 Constitution that all Haitians could back
Estim6 on was the Haitian claim to the island of Navassa, located thirty-two miles
southwest of Haiti. This island was a major source of guano, which was used in
fertilizer. Therefore, ownership of Navassa was important to the Haitian peasantry,
who needed to fertilize their fields cheaply. Beyond the economic, Navassa was
important symbolically in Haiti's resistance to imperialism. The United States division
of Caribbean Affairs issued a protest to the Haitian claim to Navassa. However, the
Haitian claim remained in the constitution. The United States did not seem to believe
that Haiti would act on their claim and noted "this is a customary provision in previous
Haitian Constitutions, and we were simply reserving our rights." 83 The United States
had gained Navassa in the mid-nineteenth century and never actually left. The
American government explained "since we are in actual possession of Navassa and the
Haitian Government does not press its claim, the matter is usually quiescent."84
83 Charles Hauch Memo, FR US: 1946, p. 930.
8 Policy Statement prepared in the Department of State, FR US: 1951, p. 1463.
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Though the Haitian Government under Estim6 attempted to "press its claim," the Island
of Navassa remained in the possession of the United States.
Navassa is more than an island of putrid bird droppings. It is a part of the anti-
imperialist symbolic lexicon of Haiti. Alongside Toussaint l'Ouverture, Charlemagne
Pralte, and the 'Steamroller' is Navassa, a small and stinking island that has at points
been a literal battleground on which Americans and Haitians have fought. It is also a
symbolic battleground on which the first independent black republic disputed the newly
expanding United States' first imperial possession. Navassa has proven itself
something of a dark secret in the correspondence of American officials and
businessmen. Frank Crumbie took an interest in the island after hearing of it while
working as a customs collector in Jeremie. Crumbie later became president of the
Rockland Trust Company before he died in 1960. He had a defined interest in bizarre
tales and collected newspaper clippings, dealing with everything from ectoplasm to
leopard men, from various American newspapers. He also compiled various recipes for
poison, apparently gleaned from a bokor he knew in Haiti. 85 In February of 1953 he set
about compiling information related to Navassa with the intent of writing an article
about it. In a letter requesting information on the island he notes "I was told that I
should not write about it during war times."86 On the letter in response to Crumbie's
inquiries are the notes "To publish anything about Navassa you will have to get
permission from the Commandant. US Coast Guard, Wash. D.C." " As the
85 Crumbie Papers. MS Group 14, boxes 1, 5, 6.
86 Frank Crumbie to Office of the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, 3 February 1953. Crumble
Papers.
8 Adam Bishop to Frank Crumbie, 28 August 1953. Crumble Papers.
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correspondence continues, a fairly sordid history directly connected to race and
imperialism emerges. The United States staked a claim on Navassa in 1857 under the
Guano Act. The Guano Act held that uninhabited and unclaimed territories on which
guano could be mined were subject to U.S. annexation. Haiti, however, considered
Navassa to be under Haitian sovereignty since 1804. In response to U.S. claims on the
island, the Haitian government sent 2 war vessels to Navassa in 1858. For the next 31
years the United States and Haiti continued to dispute Navassa. U.S. courts upheld
U.S. claims and Haitians maintained Haitian claims so that the first U.S. colonial
possession was such only in name.
American claims to Navassa became more tangible in 1889. In that year eleven
white superintendents and one hundred and thirty-seven black American laborers
arrived at Navassa to begin mining guano. The workers were on fifteen month
contracts and were to be paid upon returning to Baltimore after their contracts were up.
Further, part of their wages was to be withheld as payment for the return passage.
Working in the sun shoveling, hacking, and loading bird excrement was both laborious
and unhealthy. The workers alleged abuse and overwork, and many in fact fell ill. The
parallels to slavery under a new guise were there to be made. Whether the workers of
Navassa made this connection or not, many of them organized in opposition to the
whites and revolted in 1889, the same year they arrived. They took up their axes and
attacked their white supervisors, who were themselves armed with guns. In the battle,
nine of the workers were killed and fifteen were injured. Several of the whites were
injured as well, and at least one was killed. Crumbie characterizes the black workers as
both "nigs" and "murderers," but has no such labels for the white supervisors. Indeed,
40
the nine blacks killed are dismissed in his notes. However, he does explain that the
remaining blacks involved were brought back to the United States, where they were
tried and convicted. Their cases were appealed on the basis that Navassa was outside
U.S. jurisdiction. The appeal went to the Supreme Court, illustrating the questionable
nature of U.S. possession of Navassa. However, the Supreme Court upheld the
convictions based upon the Guano Act of 1856.88
Nine workers died in the 1889 uprising, and for nine more years guano mining
operations continued on Navassa. In 1898 the guano mining operations were
abandoned, but a few men were left there "to keep [the] island 'occupied."' 89 U.S.
mining operations were then replaced by German mining ventures. As the dominant
power in Haiti prior to the U.S. occupation, German companies mined bauxite on
Navassa. "The story is that a German company mined the bauxite using prisoners for
the purpose."9 Whether the prisoners were German, Haitian, or affiliated with some
other nationality is not mentioned. At any rate, they were treated in a manner similar to
their African American predecessors of the 1890s. When not engaged in mining, the
workers were housed in three cells and chained to a ringbolt fixed in the center of each
room. The German tenure on Navassa was a fairly short one and the U.S. reasserted
their claims to the island during the occupation. Throughout it all, Haiti and the United
States had maintained their claims to Navassa. The occupation demonstrated that the
United States was willing to claim resources and protect investments through force.
88 Crumbie papers, MS Group 14, box 1.
9 Ibid.
" Bishop to Crumbie, Crumbie Papers.
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Thus, the United States was able to re-assert itself in Navassa and build a lighthouse
through the aid of Cuban labor in 1916. The following year, Haitians described as
"vandals" destroyed the living quarters attached to the lighthouse and were arrested.9 '
This would be the last documented case of physical resistance to U.S. encroachment on
Navassa. From 1917-1946 Haitian accommodation of U.S. interests made Navassa an
American possession to all but the general populace of Haiti. It was not until the 1946
Constitution that Navassa, the fetid microcosm of imperialism, re-appeared in U.S.-
Haitian relations.
The policies of the Estim6 Administration, such as his refusal to abandon claims
to Navassa, did little to endear Haiti to the United States Government. In preparing the
new Constitution, the Estim6 administration directly attempted to gain greater
autonomy. The Constitution also made clear the connection between national identity
and government policy. Articles six and thirteen of the proposed constitution targeted
foreign business. Article six would limit foreign land holdings in Haiti and was
believed to be an attack on large American businesses. Article thirteen read as follows:
Only native-born Haitians (i.e. 'Haitiens d'origine') may be engaged in retail business,
manage such business and be engaged in such other commercial, industrial and
professional activities as the law shall determine. A Haitian by origin is defined as any
person of the black race, born of a father who himself is born a Haitian. Any person is
also a Haitian by origin when of the black race, when not recognized by his father, but
born of a mother who was Haitian by birth.92
Haitian identity here is clearly linked to blackness. Mulattos are not singled out in the
definition, demonstrating the pervasiveness of blackness in Haitian identity after 1946.
9' Ibid.
92 Charge Mooers to Secretary of State, FR US: 1946, p. 920.
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Another feature of this definition was that it favored Haitians to foreigners in business
endeavors. The United States was "at a loss to understand why legislation apparently...
highly detrimental to legitimate American financial investments in Haiti should be
contemplated."9 3 In response the United States thought "It might be well to remind the
Haitian officials that if they and other responsible Haitians desire the continuance of
mutually beneficial economic development by United States private enterprise, such
enterprise should not be discouraged by discriminations against foreign investors,
entrepreneurs and technicians."9 4
Estime validated U.S. fears of article six by dissolving the Standard Fruit
Company. The Standard Fruit Company was a large American owned company that
held contracts with peasant fruit-growers. In 1935 the Vincent administration, in
concert with the United States, had granted an export monopoly to Standard Fruit.9 5 In
1947, Estim6 refused to conclude a new agreement with the Standard Fruit Company.
This caused a precipitous drop in banana exports, a trend that continued well after his
presidency.9 6 He denied the new contract, based on the perception of Standard Fruit as
a foreign leech and on his support for Haitian businesses. Haitians considered Standard
Fruit another example of foreign powers profiting from the toil of the peasantry. Thus
government support of a high profile company like Standard Fruit could be easily
connected to the abuses of SHADA under the Lescot Administration. Estim6 certainly
wanted to avoid such a connection. His refusal to conclude a new agreement led to
9Ibid, p. 917.
9 Secretary of State to Tittmann, FR US: 1946, p. 922.
95 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1971), p. 178.
9 Edouard Francisque, La structure economique et socialle d 'Haiti (Port-au-Prince, 1986), p. 129.
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American "concern for the future of United States business."97 Clearly the United
States perceived Estim6 as a threat to its hegemony. Estim6 implemented economic
policies that favored Haitian autonomy and these ran counter to U.S. designs. The
Estim administration also made race an issue in relations between the United States
and Haiti.
Race was negotiated in the drafting of the 1946 Constitution. The U.S. suggested
the "elimination of the words 'of the black race,' pointing out that to retain this
prerequisite would be a violation of the United Nations Charter, inasmuch as no
distinction as to race should be incorporated into the Constitution."98 In response to the
possibility of recognizing Creole as an official language entertained in the drafting of
the constitution, the U.S. expressed the opinion that "Creole should not be recognized
or permitted as a medium of expression in political assemblies."9 Here the United
States was actively suppressing the very "democracy" they claimed as their political
and normative foundation. The language of the people of Haiti was not to be
recognized in politics and governance. Through the medium of language, U.S. officials
meant to deal with the Haitian elite exclusively and supported the chasm between rich
and poor as it related to legislation. On the surface, the objection to the inclusion of
race in the Haitian constitution seems admirable. Yet when coupled with the
suggestion that Creole be barred from the political sphere, the dubious nature of U.S.
objections becomes apparent. The motive behind these suggestions appears to be a
97 Hauch Memo, FR US: 1947, p. 735.
98 Tittmann to Secretary of State, FR US: 1946, p. 927.
99Ibid, p. 928.
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recognition of the re-emergence of noirisme in Haitian politics. Noirisme ran counter
to U.S. hegemony and could not be allowed expression in the Constitution of Haiti.
Thus, blackness in any form needed to be eliminated from the constitution. Further, to
allow a constitutionally backed black identity in the Western Hemisphere could provide
a locus of protest for pre-civil rights black Americans. But because essentially all
Haitians now claimed a black identity, Creole also had to be attacked. The general
population of Haiti was not allowed an official voice. Because Haitians insisted on
claiming a black identity, the United States sought to ensure it remained under the
control of the elite, where it could most easily be destroyed. The 1946 Constitution
retained its racial component and was a victory for Estim6 and his noiriste cabinet.
However, it was not a victory that could be easily shared with the Haitian populace, as
Creole was left outside the gates of the National Palace and the National Assembly.
The barring of Creole from the official bodies of Haiti fit the agenda of the
Haitian elite. They had justified this exclusion because "Haitian Creole is not a written
language."loo In a nation where the vast majority of people were illiterate, using
writing as a prerequisite for official recognition of a language was a means of silencing
popular sentiment. The elitism of this practice is perhaps best illustrated in an anecdote
appearing in the Saturday Evening Post. It begins with an affirmation of American
racism:
Half a dozen miles off the north coast of Haiti...is a wild and steep-sloped island called
Tortuga. As a seventeenth century buccaneers' stronghold a kind of violent prosperity
touched it for a day. Now there is not a single white man on Tortuga. There are,
however, some thousands of Negros - primitive folk who farm and fish, and want little
'"" "La Question d Creole, " Le Nouvelliste, 17 September 1948.
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more than a pair of pants to wear, a burro to ride and a grass-thatched hut to keep off
the rain.' 01
Here prosperity is equated with whiteness and primitive is synonymous with blackness.
After establishing this background the article tells of a missionary's efforts to convert
the island's residents through the aid of bibles. The priest returns to visit Madame
Aricia, a mambo who had apparently converted to Christianity, and the following
ensues
She invited him in happily, chattering about the satisfaction she had found in her new
religion and the evidences she had observed of its truth. Then his eye, moving about
the little room, fell upon the Bible. Its cover drooped oddly. P6re Najac rose and
opened it. Many pages had been removed. 'Why have you mutilated your Book?' he
asked quietly. 'Mutilated?' Madame Aricia asked, wide-eyed ... Listen. You are a man
of learning; you read your Bible and absorb its truths. But I cannot read. How then am
I to absorb its truths into my mind and heart and body? I'll tell you. Each morning I
tear a leaf from my Bible and eat it. 02
The purpose of the anecdote is to illustrate the ignorance of the Haitian peasant,
however, there is far more at work here. Madame Aricia holds the same respect for the
Bible that Father Najac does. Both see it as a source of truth and power. The means of
obtaining that power is where they differ. Elitism becomes manifest in these divergent
approaches. Because her method does not fit a Western mold, Madame Aricia is
portrayed as a fool. The damning proof of her "ignorance" is her inability to read. This
dynamic was at work not only in the American perception of Haitians but also in the
Haitian elite view of the masses.
0! William Krauss, "Madame Aricia's Bible," Saturday Evening Post, 10 October 1942.
102 Ibid.
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Madame Aricia's literal consumption of the Bible is interesting in light of the
"trope of the Talking Book."103 Henry Louis Gates, Jr. discerns this trope in eighteenth
century slave narratives. It involved the perception of various African slaves and
American Indians that books actually spoke to Europeans. This was not an
unreasonable assumption for them to make in light of the fact that literacy was fairly
alien even in Europe, where it is likely peasants held a similar view of books. The
ability of books to exclude all but Europeans from their dialogue imparted their power
and demonstrated the barring of marginalized groups such as slaves and peasants from
this power. Europeans in fact defined humanity in terms of literacy and placed
Africans at the lowest end of a racial hierarchy based on their general illiteracy. "So,
while the Enlightenment is famous for establishing its existence upon man's ability to
reason, it simultaneously used the absence and presence of reason to delimit and
circumscribe the very humanity of the cultures and people of color which Europeans
had been "discovering" since the Renaissance." 104 Reason in this case was
synonymous with literacy. Based on the inequality inherent to slavery, slaves were
forced to contend with the charges of inferiority that their European master's leveled at
them. Within this situation literacy was an avenue of resistance. "To read and write
was to transgress this nebulous realm of liminality."10 5
Americans inherited this equation of literacy with reason and by extension
humanity, and it presented itself in their interactions with Haitians, both directly and in
03 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Signifling Monkey: A Theory of Afro-American Literary Criticism
(Oxford, 1988). This is title of chapter 4 and an important aspect of the book as a whole.
"4 Ibid., p. 130.
Ms Ibid., p. 128.
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publications such as the Saturday Evening Post. The Haitian elite adopted this concept
and were, in one sense, driven to literacy by faith in it to begin with. The peasantry
also recognized the power of the word and attempted to receive it in various ways. For
Madame Aricia, the method was to eat pages of the Bible everyday, expressing a
respect for the power of the book in an animistic sense. More often, the course of
Haitian peasants was to send their children to school in order to empower them. Alfred
M6traux explains "it is the every peasant's ambition to send his children to school ...
and he will make any sacrifice in order to be able to do so." 06 Metraux's gendering of
the peasantry as male, while most likely dictated by the rules of French grammar, is
interesting for two reasons. First, the money funding the education of peasant children
was most often that of market women. Second, Americans and elite Haitians gendered
the peasantry female invoking their secondary status in Haitian society. Madame
Aricia is just one example of this practice, which is discussed more fully in Chapter V.
U.S. officials could rest assured that Creole would remain outside the realm of
legislation, but the fear that an officially recognized affirmation of blackness could
stimulate agitation in the United States had some merit. "Estim6's ascension to power
provided an opportunity for new cooperation between Haitian and African American
leaders, with the NAACP resurrecting its role as Haiti's publicity agent."107 The
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People had initially acted as a
"publicity agent" for Haiti during the occupation. Relations between African-
106 Alfred Metraux quoted in Paul Farmer, Aids and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame
(Berkeley, 1992) p. 34.
107 Pamphile, Haitians and African-Americans. p. 150.
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Americans and Haitians tended to become tighter when Haiti asserted a black identity
in opposition to U.S. hegemony. At such times Haiti proved a readily available
rhetorical device for the aspirations of organizations such as the NAACP and the
UNIA. On the Haitian side, the activities of African-Americans supplied the elite with
ammunition for their ambitions. In numerous newspaper articles the Haitian elite take
an active interest in the situation of black Americans. They are able to discern the color
line and express a particular concern for blacks in the American South. They also
impose a distinction between black and mulatto on the American context in order to
attack it in the Haitian milieu. Invoking the primacy of noirisme in mid-twentieth
century Haiti, Dieudonn6 Lubin notes "We do not need to redden our black American
brothers (I refer in the term black to the lights as well)."108 That is, advancement was
no longer the province of mulattos, and all African-Americans and Haitians could
embrace blackness as a unifying factor. But the weakness of this new black identity is
revealed in its goal, "My dream is that more Haitians will go to the United States and
see the progress made by the black in contact with white civilization."' 09 It was this
faith in Western civilization that most profoundly separated the elite from the
commoner in Haiti. In proclaiming blackness, the average Haitian was attacking the
class schism that beleaguered Haiti. Yet for the elite, noirisme was a conduit to
civilization and modernity and a useful tool for muting the division between rich and
poor.
08 Dieudonn6 Lubin, "Impressions de voyage le negre et son probleme aux Etats-Unis," Le Matin, 15
October 1947.
10 Ibid.
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In response to Haitian contestation of U.S. hegemony during the Estime
administration, the American government withheld development loans. Haitians and
African-Americans employed race in order to secure funds. Lucien Hibbert, Rector of
the University of Haiti, "made reference to the loans the United States has made to
European countries and stated that the Haitian public was sometimes unable to
understand why the U.S. government were willing to advance money to other countries
but not to Haiti."" 0 Walter White, President of the NAACP, was far more explicit in
linking the denial of loans to race and stated that it was "an example of 'Yanqui
imperialism' and racial bigotry."' " For his assistance, White was awarded the Haitian
order of Honor and Merit. This was an honor that Lescot had granted to President
Eisenhower; the Estime administration had a far different approach to foreign relations.
Under Estim6, Haitian-NAACP collaboration was successful and "the Export-Import
Bank granted Haiti $4 million loan to finance construction of flood control, irrigation,
and drainage works in the Artibonite Valley."1' 2 Thus, the Estime government in
concert with the NAACP was able to use race to obtain economic concessions. The
U.S. decided to grant assistance to Haiti because of "the happy effect assistance to a
Negro republic would have on the colored races everywhere.""
3 The United States
Government was willing to aid Haiti in order to divert the ire of blacks within the
10 Memorandum of conversation between Charles Hauch, division of Caribbean affairs and Lucien
Hibbert, FR US: 1947, p. 732.
"' Pamphile, Haitians and African-Americans. p. 152.
"2 Ibid.
13 Hauch Memo, FR US: 1946, p. 949.
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United States. The Estim6 administration had found alliance with American blacks
more fruitful than accommodation to U.S. interests.
Race was of great importance in the U.S. assessment of the Estim6 administration.
The Estim6 cabinet was primarily composed of noiristes. It included Dr. Jean Price-
Mars as Minister of Foreign Affairs." 4 Francois Duvalier was Secretary of Labor and
Public Health. 1 5 Daniel Fignol6 served a partial term as Minister of Education. The
cabinet also included Gaston Margron as Minister of Finance. Margron was not a
noiriste and was believed by the United States to be "perhaps the only
Haitian...considered to have the capacity to grasp fully the operation of Haitian
finances."" The United States claimed that Margron "[knew] that once the complete
control of Haitian finances [was] returned to Haiti ... his old job in the National Bank
now being held open for him, would vanish into thin air.""17 Employing the threat of
economic ruin, the United States hoped to use Margron's position as minister of finance
to strengthen their hold on Haiti. Because Margron feared the possibility of losing his
elite status, which had material expression in his National Bank job, he could be
counted upon to aid U.S. interests. Estim6 however did not fear autonomy and believed
that Haiti would prosper without the United States on its back.
Estim's attempts to gain Haitian autonomy earned him the scorn of the U.S.
government. In a discussion with Ambassador Tittmann, he stated bluntly "sometimes
I ask myself if it is the policy to keep this country as it is, and that you are carrying out
114 Wilson to Secretary of State, FR US: 1947, p. 914.
"5 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier. p.168.
"" Tittmann to Secretary of State, FRUS: 1946, p. 944.
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that policy."'18 Estim6 elicited U.S. imperialism and went on to note "that it wasn't
their fault that Haiti was in the Western Hemisphere."' 19 Tittmann characterized
Estim6 as "irritable, hostile, emotional, and inclined to blame the United States and the
Bank for his inability to make a complete change overnight." 2 0 Such a
characterization was reminiscent of the depiction of Haitians as "mad from the sight of
blood."' 2 ' Estim6's resistance to U.S. hegemony was subsumed under mental and
emotional traits ascribed to him by a U.S. official. The U.S. suggestion for the revision
of a 1941 executive agreement required "that a competent Haitian be appointed to head
the Haitian financial system." 22 Throughout U.S. government documents from 1946-
50, "Haitian" was qualified with the term "competent." The clear implication was that
Haitians in general were incompetent. Coupled with the fact that Haiti was perceived
as the "Negro republic" the characteristic of incompetence would seem to be linked to
racial constructs.
The extension of "Haitian incompetence" was "benevolent hegemony." If
Haitians were incompetent, except in the case of accommodationists like Gaston
Margron, then the United States should direct investment and policy on the island. The
Haitian perspective was quite different. Philippe Charles Haitian Ambassador to the
U.S. stated "one cannot question the good intentions of the United States, but every
time the United States has tried to help us, they have increased our confusion and
"R Ibid, p. 937.
"9 Ibid
"0 Ibid.
12 R.B. Davis, FR US: 1916, p. 318.
22 Tittmann to Secretary of State, FR US: 1946, p. 943.
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poverty instead of lessening it."1 23 In other words, Haitians should be in control of
investment and governance in their nation. From the Haitian standpoint Americans
were interested in profit and not development, while from the U.S. vantage point
Haitians were incapable of productive self-government.
An example of the divergent perspectives of Haitians and Americans is how
each viewed the activities of the Societe Haltiane Americaine Development Agricole
(SHADA). SHADA was controlled by the United States and directed investment in
agricultural programs nationally. It was most active during the presidency of Lescot,
from 1941-46, but continued to operate under Estim&. Estim6 sought to gain control of
SHADA and put it towards programs like the irrigation of the Artibonite, in which he
was successful. SHADA was a political demon based on its association with
imperialism and the graft of the Lescot administration. U.S. Director of Caribbean
Affairs, Charles Hauch, noted that Haitians made the "usual Haitian claim that SHADA
had expropriated lands, destroyed crops, cut down trees, and not compensated the
peasants for their losses." 24 Haitians perceived SHADA to be a wave of
transmogrification that converted land into intangible capital. Under Lescot, valuable
cropland was used for sisal, rubber and other exports, the profits of which were
distributed within the government and never reached the general population.
Nonetheless, the U.S. government perceived SHADA's activities to be "a substantial
contribution to the improvement of the Haitian economy."
125 Therefore they expected
23 Circular Airgram, FRUS: 1947, p. 727.
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the Estim6 administration to pay for the debts relative to SHADA that had been
incurred during Lescot's tenure in office.
For the Haitian peasantry "development" was often an impediment rather than a
catalyst to progress. Alex Dupuy explains that SHADA
... acquired land in various regions of the country for a total of 133,400 hectares, or
21.5 percent of the total cultivated area of Haiti. In the process of establishing these
plantations, large numbers of peasants were evicted from their land and their crops
destroyed. Some peasants were given no more than 48 hours to leave their land, paid
$25 per carreau planted, or a mere $5 in other cases. Tenant farmers received a
compensation of $10. By July 1943, the SHADA employed a total of 64,400 workers
on its various plantations...the workers received a wage of 30 cents per day for a ten-
hour day.'2 6
What U.S. officials claimed to be a substantial improvement to the Haitian economy
was in reality an unabashed attack on an entire way of life. To the Haitian peasant, land
is the crux of society. James Leyburn notes that "land is to the peasant both home and
living; his household is dependent almost solely upon the product of its own labor."'
2 7
Beyond being the source of income and sustenance it is the residence of ancestors and
lwa. "The lwa, and peoples' relations with them, stand (to borrow a locally significant
metaphor) at the very crossroads of Haitian social and cultural life."12' Lwa are non-
corporeal yet anthropomorphic spirits who function as gods and exist within the
physical and temporal world.'29 They serve a multitude of functions from aiding in
126 Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the World Economy (London, 1989), p. 145.
127 James Leyburn, The Haitian People (New Haven, CT, 1941) p. 74. Leyburn generally employs "he"
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harvests to settling disputes. As noted, these lva are connected to the land. "Over and
above the ceremonial importance of particular sites, however, land has always been --
and undeniably remains -- the sine qua non of personal freedom and individual
autonomy ... from its very inception in the pre-Revolutionary peasant adaptations of
freedmen and maroons." 30 Since the revolution "the average Haitian preferred to be
his own master, working only when he wished, and particularly working only for
himself and his family."' 3' SHADA forced nearly a quarter of the Haitian peasantry to
trade their independence, however economically fragile, for wage labor under the
direction of the elite in conjunction with foreigners.
The source of this oppression was fairly clear to the peasantry. Paul Farmer has
described the manner in which AIDS, during the Duvalier years and beyond, was
perceived as "an illness that could be 'sent' on an enemy."' 3 2 The dynamic informing
this perception had its "origins in the colonial epoch, and the lineage of these ideas may
be studied in the historical record." 33 Under Lescot, AIDS was not the scourge of the
peasantry, SHADA was. Through SHADA, the elite were able to literally transform
the central feature of peasant life, land, into worthless rubber and sisal. The peasantry
could not eat either product and were barred from the power to trade them for more
useful things. SHADA was simply another expression of the disenfranchisement of the
peasantry, who were subjected to the desires of the distant rulers of Washington D.C.
3" Ibid.. 253-254.
"1 James Leybum, The Haitian People, p. 65.
13' Paul Farmer, Aids and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography' of Blame. p. 257
133 Ibid.
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and Port-au-Prince. As the peasants perceived it, through SHADA the moun lavil (city
people) sent a flood of destruction upon ancestral lands.
The United States Government and the Haitian elite ignored the fact that peasant
proprietorship had long been the heart of Haitian conceptions of freedom. During the
occupation "the locally oriented subsistence agriculture cherished by Haitian peasants
registered with American progressives as little more than a sign of backwardness."13 4
Mary Renda explains the American view of peasant proprietorship during the
occupation as follows:
Its value as an optimal economic arrangement for a people at odds with international
capitalism was inadmissible within a racial and class framework that denied black
peasants the ability to determine their own interest. The very notion of
developmentalism ... presupposed that there was but one path toward progress and
light. And this assumption - that the path followed by Western European countries and
by the United States was the proper path for all - was, among other things, a racial
assumption. In this sense, racial hierarchy under girded liberal development at every
point. 135
This attitude continued to characterize the American perspective during Estim6's
presidency. Yet it was not only Americans who considered the Haitian peasant to be
"backwards." The Haitian elite shared this perspective as well. For Americans, the
solution was to help Haitians overcome their "racial handicap" and embrace capitalism.
Under Lescot, the peasantry was not so much a problem as a resource, which could be
tapped through "development" projects like SHADA. Under Estim6, the solution to the
"peasant problem" was modernization. This is not to argue that the Haitian peasant
lived a romantic existence close to the land and ancestral spirits. To the contrary,
13 Mary Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940
(Chapel Hill, NC, 2001), p. 114.
13 Ibid.
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Haitians faced poverty as a very real difficulty. However, the modernization promoted
by Estim6 did more to act upon peasants than to empower them. To add insult to
injury, programs like SHADA, though a manifestation of U.S. hegemony and not an
Estim6 modernization program, disconnected peasants from land, which was of greater
value in every aspect of life than a menial job could ever be. Further, SHADA entailed
oppression for a people who equated subsistence agriculture with freedom.'
3 6
The fact that they were expected to foot the bill for SHADA programs under
Lescot outraged Haitians. In February of 1946 workers and peasants demonstrated in
front of the SHADA building in Port-au-Prince. Le Nouvelliste warned of the
importance that "the leaders of SHADA understand the direction and spirit of the
revolution of January 7 th and do right through arbitration of the demands of the
employees and workmen of the forest."'
37 Their demands were for the cancellation of
SHADA debt because they felt "Haitians did not have a voice in the handling of the
funds."' 3 8 The SHADA debt was six million dollars and from the Haitian point of view
resulted from the bad economic policy of the United States alongside the Lescot
administration. 139 Where American officials believed Haitians to be incompetent,
Haitians considered the United States out of touch with their needs as evidenced in
programs like SHADA. Further, Haitians felt they were being charged six million
dollars for giving up their land and freedom to Americans.
136 For an examination of a similar situation in post-"emancipation" Jamaica see Thomas Holt, The
Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938 (Baltimore, MD,
1992).
1 "Manifestation contre Holdrige devant les Bureaux de la SHADA," Le Nouvelliste, 1 Februaury 1946.
13 Ibid.
139 Clement Celestin "Mauvaise politique economique," Le Nouvelliste, 28 Februaury 1946.
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"Haitian incompetence" seemed in actuality to be pragmatism. The United
States was concerned with converting Haitian goods into profit. Haitians were
concerned with bettering their living conditions. Estim6's attempt to secure funds for a
slum-clearing project further illustrates the different objectives of Haitians and
Americans. The Estim6 administration sought a loan for a slum clearing and housing
project in order to stimulate tourism and respond to the demands of the urban poor for
better living conditions. Yet the U.S. controlled Export-Import Bank responded with
the following:
The bank recognizes that such projects are desirable and often essential to the health
and welfare of the people of all countries; however, they do not directly enhance the
productive capacity of the country and thereby create the means by which there can be
produced the additional goods out of which a loan must be repaid.1
40
In order to secure the loan, the Haitian Government played on cold war fears. Dr,
Rigaud, former Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, "emphasized the thirty to forty
thousand intellectuals, who, he said, were young men of good education who could not
find positions in Haiti and hence were potential political organizers and agitators."
4 1
The Estim6 administration was thereby able to secure the loan and proceed with the
slum clearance. The slum-clearance provided employment, but rather than provide the
urban poor with housing, the area was used for the International exposition. This
stimulated tourism and created more temporary jobs.142
1" Secretary of State to Haitian Embassy, FR US: 1948, p. 597.
141 Hauch Memo, FR US: 1946, p. 947.
14 Abbott, Haiti: An Insider's Historv. p. 56.
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L Ap Vann Ayisyen Yo
Tourism was central to the Estim6 administration. It was the means by which the
elite of Haiti could fund modernization and capitalize on "Le Vogue Negre."'4 3 At the
root of Le Vogue Negre was a prurient fascination with the "primitive" and
"mysterious." In this sense racism was vital to tourism because it was the very
"otherness" of the common Haitian that made them a marketable resource. From the
American perspective blackness was a mark of inferior evolution and a badge of
savagery. Further, 87.5 percent of the Haitian population was rural, making them all
the more intriguingly "backward" to the American tourist.144 Indeed Haiti met all the
prerequisites of American superstition making it an enticing tourist stop. For these
same reasons Americans sought to distance themselves from Haitians when visiting.
An English language article in Cahiers d'Haiti states excitedly that "Haiti has a Yacht
Club" and goes on to note "safe fresh water is to be made available, diesel oil and
gasoline, groceries and all necessary provisions can be delivered at the dock."14 5
Noticeably, Haitian water was assumed tainted and the prospect of going into a market
to secure provisions was unpalatable. This was likely due to the assumed volatility of
the Haitian people. "The only reason that hundreds of Americans cruising yachts have
not visited Haiti before the war was that the Republic had no Yacht Club; no place
"3 Brenda Gayle Plummer, Haiti and the United States. p. 130.
144 Statistical abstract of Latin America, l0 edition (Los Angeles, 1966), p.14. The statistic is for the
year 1950 and it is safe to assume that prior to that year an even greater percentage of the Haitian
population was rural.
145 Commodore Horace Ashton, "Haiti has a Yacht Club" Cahiers d 'Haiti, April 1945, p. 39.
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where a visiting yacht could anchor in safety."' 4 6 Apparently it was considered unsafe
to visit Haiti without a yacht club present. Invoking the racism integral to Haitian
tourism, the same article explains "As one of the two Negro republics of the world, it
has long been a land overflowing with appeal for the traveller no matter what his
interest."1 47 In the 1930s and 1940s the interest of American travelers was in a Haitian
culture sanitized, dislocated, and appropriated by the Haitian government.
The Estim6 administration recognized Haiti's appeal to tourists and sought to use
it to secure the money that would fund modernization. Haitian newspapers stressed the
natural beauty of the island as the real catalyst to tourism. "The landscapes of Haiti are
picturesque and combine all the astonishing color of New Mexico and Colorado with
the luxuriance of the tropics."148 From the Haitian point of view the American West
was exotic and is invoked here as part of the draw of Haiti. The appeal of exoticism is
recognized but articulated in reference to the United States.
In order to reap the profits of "Le vogue Negre" the Estim6 administration ftinded
hotels and expositions. They courted Pan American Airways and Hilton Hotels and
considered the possibility of a casino in Port-au-Prince. But the centerpiece of Estim6's
tourism agenda was the International Exposition of 1949. As such, the newspapers
followed the construction of the exposition grounds closely. Le Matin devoted an
entire section of its August 17* edition to the urban renewal projects of Estim6. In
11 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
41 "La culture francaise grandit en Haiti la Republique est un vrai charme pour les touristes," Le Matin,
30/31 March 1947.
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laborious detail all of the road paving and maintenance projects of the island were
catalogued, complete with commentary. The attention given the exposition was based
on the belief that it would allow Haiti to "realize its personal destiny and contribute to
the prosperity of the Haitian community."14 9 Tourism and modernization were seen as
inseparable, even as the exotic appeal of Haiti was superficially opposed to modernity.
The commodification of Haitian culture placed the peasantry in an awkward
position. Under Lescot Vodou and the songs and dances associated with it had been
simultaneously suppressed and appropriated by the Haitian government. A legal
distinction was made between folklore and superstition, allowing the elite to mold an
idealized popular culture palatable to outsiders. "In a sense, by legalizing what had
never before been expressly prohibited, the law annexed the figure of popular dance to
the state and laid a juridical groundwork for the subsequent promotion of this construct
as an official national sign. "0 Haitian cultural expressions less easily consumed or
perceived as a threat could be labeled superstition and repressed in response. The elite
needed the peasantry in order to legitimize their hollow versions of popular culture.
Yet the elite had long distrusted the peasantry and held themselves aloof from the
common man. Hence, the Haitian peasant was both the lifeblood and the bane of this
reconstituted Haitian folklore.
Under Estim6 the distinction between folklore and superstition was less defined
but the exploitation of the peasantry for foreign consumption remained central to
149 "La politique des routes," Le Matin, 17 August 1948.
" Kate Ramsey, "Without One Ritual Note: Folklore Performance and the Haitian State, 1935-1946,"
Radical History Review. 84 fall 2002, p. 14.
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tourism. Estim6 strove to make tourism the economic base of Haiti. In this sense he
picked up where Lescot had left off. But by the late 1940s the yacht club was no longer
a prerequisite for catalyzing tourism. By this point Haitian tourism was secure and the
Estim6 administration strove to maintain it as such. The draw of Haiti remained the
same, an advertisement in English running in Le Matin throughout 1948 showcased a
disheveled and dejected Haitian boy staring at the ground and stated:
Amazing show-Latest Vodoo dances. Haitian folklore scenery. Songs, drums, vodoo
creations. Exciting, startling show! Do not fail to go to <<Wodoo Club>> See a 6 year
old child petting, Kissing, playing with a rattle snake, Wonderful.- Typical Haitian
numbers. Unexcelled enjoyment. Something worthy of your time. Bring all your
friends at the VODOO CLUB open on Wednesday and Saturday Dancing with a
<<Super-Jazz .151
Leaving the sexual undertones of the advertisement aside, the appeals to elitism and
racism are clear. The child exploited by this advertisement is a ready example of the
liminal position of the peasantry, which was most profound in the meeting of religion
and tourism under the gaze of the government.
Maya Deren presents an example of the divergent pulls of tradition and
performance. She describes the participation of a ougan named Titon in the
International Exposition of 1949, which was the culmination of Estim6's tourism
campaign.
During the period of the Haitian International Exposition, an effort was made to present
Voudoun as a folklore attraction for tourists: to stage dances and rituals, and even
simulate possession by deities. Titon's ability as a dancer and singer made him an
obvious choice for this entertainment. Yet from the beginning, his Ghede opposed his
participation. Titon himself could not understand the opposition, and in a desperate
desire to earn the needed money, accepted the employment.5 2
151 "Vodoo Club in Carefour," Le Main, 24 March 1948.
12 Maya Deren, Divine Horsemen: Voodoo Gods of Haiti (New York, 1970), p. 79.
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Titon gave only one performance because his left eye closed up and he took it as a
signal to withdraw from the exposition. Deren claims "Titon himself had neither the
sophistication nor the experience to evaluate the presentation precisely."'s 3 Indeed
Deren is quite skeptical of Titon's mental capacity. Yet his position as a ougan and his
apparent discomfort with presenting aspects of the religion he held sacred does not
seem to require ignorance on his part. In fact, Titon's guilt in making a caricature of
his beliefs in order to bring in vital funds is evidence of a fairly lucid understanding of
his situation.
From a strictly economic standpoint Titon's situation was preferable to that of
most other peasants disconnected from the benefits noirisme had promised. In giving
the peasantry a voice, albeit one loosely translated into French and censored, the Estim6
administration had improved upon previous administrations, at least at the symbolic
level. For this reason much of the peasantry was willing to put faith in Estim6 and he is
remembered without the same disdain accorded rulers such as Lescot. However, the
distance between city and country remained far more than that of the rutted roads and
footpaths that connected them. One measure of the dislocation between urban and rural
Haiti was technology. Estim6's "tomb of the virgins" was a rarity. Cars were the
possessions of elite Haitians and foreigners staying on the island. Even in the late
1950s when the automobile had become relatively commonplace in the "modern"
153 Ibid., p. 80.
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world, there were only about nine thousand vehicles in all of Haiti, which had a
population exceeding three million. "4
In 1946 one Haitian car, in particular, traversed the boundary between urban and
rural, modern and traditional. Among the people of Haiti a story had been circulating
that a "tiger car" was driving through rural areas and kidnapping children. Late on a
Saturday evening in September of that year people near Leogane noticed a youth
disappear in the dim lights of an automobile. At the same moment a passer-by upset a
dog, which kicked off a string of barks and howls as all the dogs of the area joined in
the distress. The people of the area believed that "l 'auto-tigre" or more appropriately
"machin tig la" had kidnapped a local child. Accordingly a group of at least thirty
people organized to retrieve it, the gender of the child is not disclosed. Because
Leogane was relatively urban in contrast to other areas of Haiti, it is difficult to
consider this group peasants, though they may have been. In any case they were not
members of the elite and their story imparts something of the overall perception of the
underclass, being workers and peasants, to the process of modernization. They made
their way to a Port-au-Prince hotel where they believed the tiger car to reside. The car
thought to be the auto-tigre belonged to the wife of a Max Bouchereau. The group
demanded the whereabouts of the kidnapped child and when the Bouchereaus claimed
ignorance of the incident they were attacked. They managed to escape after receiving
severe injuries from rocks and machetes. 5 5
15 Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 9"' edition (L.A., 1965), p. 108. No information is available
prior to 1958 but it is safe to assume that in the 1940s there were far less than 9,000 cars in Haiti.
1 "L'Affaire Bouchereau: n'a aucun caractere mysterieux," Le Nouvelliste, 2 September 1946,
p. 1, 4 .
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The violent reaction of the underclass to the "tiger car" offers a glimpse into their
perspective of modernity. The legend of "machin tig la" posits modernity as literally
consuming the underclass. Modernity is represented in the form of a car, an apt symbol
for the concept indeed. The car is characterized as an aggressive and foreign beast
eliciting something of the lower class conception of the elite. The goal of the car is to
kidnap peasants and thereby divorce them from their land. The fact that the lower
classes knew to find the "tiger car" within Port-au-Prince suggests that they were
cognizant of the urbanization which modernity entailed. Here again, the moun lavilyo
were sending afflictions to the people.
The "tiger car" is a particularly interesting example of a sent problem. Driving
was perhaps even more elusive to the peasantry than literacy. It is unclear whether the
peasantry viewed the Bouchereaus as having actually driven the "tiger car" or simply
having sent it out to kidnap the child independently. It is however certain that the
underclass did not drive and would likely have associated the process with wanga,
magic. Once again, value judgments need to be assessed, that the underclass perceived
of processes such as modernization in terms of wanga does not condemn them as
ignorant but illustrates their lexicon for the events that had a direct resonance to their
lives. Where SHADA was a means for moun lavil to consume the land of peasants, the
"tiger car" was a way for them to consume the peasantry itself. However, the lower
classes are not complaisant in this development and take up arms to destroy the "tiger
car" and preserve their way of life.
The initial report of what became known as "l 'affaire Bouchereau" considered it
an instance of class antagonism. "The gullibility of the simple minded to the marvelous
65
tale of the auto-tigre, the overexcitement of the proletariat due to an unhealthy
propaganda of division, are the elements that constitute / 'affaire Bouchereau."1 5 In
depicting the Haitian people as gullible and excitable, the Haitian elite drew upon the
very prejudices leveled against them by American officials. They also expressed cold
war concerns in placing socialism/communism at the root of the incident. Here they
inverted false consciousness and claimed that the ignorance of the peasantry had left
them open to the self-destructive propaganda of socialism, as espoused by Emile St.
Lot. Having noted this, the article takes a shot at St. Lot by claiming that based upon
class divisions he could just as easily have been the target of the attack (since he was
now a member of the elite). By the 3 0 th of September Le Nouvelliste had backed off its
St. Lot conspiracy theory and offered two new explanations for the auto-tigre incident.
The first hypothesis was that the government had played on peasant fears in order to
scare them into lowering prices for their goods and abandoning "black market"
activities. The other hypothesis held that the incident was all a practical joke and that
the kidnapped child and the wanderer who had startled the dogs were the same
person.' 57 Neither of the theories could be substantiated and the articles relative to
"l 'affaire Bouchereau" served primarily to criticize the peasantry and the government.
The fact that a car should find expression in Haitian folklore as a hostile creature
is understandable in the larger social matrix of mid-twentieth century Haiti. The
successes of the Estim6 administration were measured largely in terms of
modernization. But the road to "civilization" was often more imposing than inviting to
15 bid., p. 4.
1 "L 'auto-tigre," Le Nouvelliste, 30 September 1946. p. 1.
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the Haitian peasant. "Yesterday, in the afternoon, at the intersection of Fonts-Forts and
Grand'Rue, a peasant woman had her right leg fractured by police motorcycle No. 15.
The victim was taken to the General Hospital."158 In this case the police and roads
characteristic of modernity were to the disadvantage of the peasantry. The Hospital
was treating injuries brought about by its birthright, "modern civilization." This is not
to be wholly cynical about the concepts of modernity and civilization but rather to
illustrate the reasons that the peasantry did not always embrace them. The Haitian elite,
however, was more fond of reproving the peasantry than empathizing with them. An
article titled "the problem of the rural markets" blamed the peasantry for the economic
distress of Leogane and Grand-Goave.15 9 The peasantry established "black markets"
where goods were sold or traded and the funds generated remained within the rural
communities. Like Estim6 the peasantry was concerned with autonomy and in pursuit
of this goal they had organized rural markets in Leogane and Grand-Goave. In doing
so they were considered to be undercutting the urban markets and foiling the progress
of the Haitian government. They were condemned with "the rural markets.. .constitute
a serious handicap to the evolution of our countrymen and of our cities.""6 The very
Haitians portrayed as incompetent and backwards in U.S. government documents were
directing the same charges towards the peasantry. Estim6's response was to send out
special agents in order to "secure wholesale and retail prices set by the Government. 61
In practice these agents "became an organized shake down squad peddling their
158 "Une paysanne victime d'accident," Le Nouvelliste, 9 January 1947. p. 1.
15 "Le probleme des marches ruraux," Le Nouvelliste. 27 September 1947. p. 1.
60 Ibid.
1 Lyonel Paquin, The Haitians: Class and Color Politics (New York, 1983) p. 104.
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protection, and bleeding the merchants." 62 Essentially the people of Leogane and
Grand-Goave were being abused for taking economics into their own hands.
The hands taking hold of economics in this case were feminine. This is because
in Haiti market activity is the province of women. Beyond this, market women are a
symbol of the peasantry. Postage stamps circulating in Haiti under the Lescot
administration illustrate this. These stamps were financed by the united nations war
relief fund and featured a market woman clothed in brilliant white standing in front of a
basket overflowing with food of all descriptions and reaching, arms outstretched, to a
group of war ravaged Europeans. 63 The Haitian peasantry was gendered as female and
glorified as a provider. The peasantry did not see themselves as providers in the war
effort but as victims of Lescot's economic policies. The women appropriated as
symbols had little access to power particularly in the urban context. The place where
women exercised the most power was in rural markets. They arrived at this position as
a result of men's dominance in cultivation. After 1804 "the gradual accumulation of
land by an expanding peasantry" provided "land enough to free women from
cultivation but not land enough to produce a yield sufficiently large to make it
profitable for the peasant cultivator to go regularly to market himself." 64 Whether this
freedom from cultivation was an expression of female empowerment or submission is
debatable. The result was that women gained control of internal commerce. Under
162Ibid.
63 "Presse de Son Excellence le President de la Republique People Haitien, le 15 Aout 1944 a
/'Occasion de la Mise en ante du Timbre Special Emis au Profit de la Section de Secours aux Nations
Unies du National War Fund," Cahiers d 'Haiti, August 1944.
164 Sidney Mintz, "Men, Women, and Trade," Comparative Studies in Society and History, v. 13, no. 3,
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their direction market activities became profitable such that in some cases "a Haitian
market woman can, by a combination of hard work, commercial acumen and good
fortune, increase her capital holdings from a few cents to a few thousand dollars."1 6
Women have retained control of market activities because "Young girls-and, often,
even babies- are taken along on trading trips, and girls always learn how to trade from
their mothers, other female relatives, or foster mothers." 6 6 While men control
production and external trade, they have "no recognized claim" to the profits of market
women.16 7 In the same way that land ownership allowed the peasantry a certain degree
of freedom from the state, marketing offered women some autonomy in a male
dominated society. As noted, the rural markets were under attack from the elite, who
considered them obstacles to modernization endorsed by Estim6. Hence the "problem
of the rural markets" was also a problem of women and from the peasant perspective
not a problem at all.
Peasant women appear in Haitian documents primarily when they are being run
over by police motorcycles or criticized for market activity. Elite women when not at
the window of Estim6's infamous car, are also accorded little in the way of
acknowledgment. They played a role subordinate to men and were rewarded through
rhetoric praising their importance to the men who excluded them from full participation
in the governance of the nation. Within the revolution of 1946 they saw an opportunity
to agitate for greater women's rights. A letter from the Ligue Femininne d'Action
1' Ibid.
166 Ibid.
'6 Ibid.
69
Sociale (LFAS) to the military junta was printed in an edition of Le Nouvelliste. Mme.
Auguste Garoute, President of LFAS, addressed the junta with "the LFAS has full
confidence in your spirit of justice and impartiality so that satisfaction is now given to
the call of the Haitian woman, which is to participate in the upcoming legislative
elections, in the full role which she intends to play there." 68 It is notable that the LFAS
took a tone of deference in recognition that it is men who will ultimately decide
whether or not they are allowed to vote. These men disregarded the confidence the
LFAS had placed in them and women were not granted the vote until 1950.
The manner in which the peasantry was gendered female and symbolized in the
form of the market woman invokes power relations within Haiti. Women, even elite
women, were second-class citizens. They were denied the vote for the majority of
Haitian history. They were granted marketing rights because these were initially
considered of little consequence. They were expected to accept male infidelity yet be
devoted in their own relationships. Hence women serve as a fitting symbol of the
peasantry. This is because like women, peasants were expected to turn the other cheek
when they were slapped. But the peasantry was also symbolically comparable to
women in that it was women who gave birth and it was women who nursed children. It
was the ancestors of the peasantry who created Haiti as an independent republic and it
was the peasantry who nurtured Haiti in the face of an abusive elite.
The desires of the peasantry were not so ominous as the United States and Haitian
elite believed them to be. In certain ways, the Haitian peasantry was willing to accept
modernity on their own terms. The destination of the funds of market women is a
68 Le Nouvelliste, 17 January 1946.
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telling example of the peasant perspective on modernity. "Market women use their
profits in domestic upkeep, for education of their children, [and] for vodoun ceremonial
payments." 69 Family, education, and religion are the primary concerns of the
peasantry. Land is both the source of their maintenance and the locus of their
existence. Education is a product of modernity that the peasantry is willing to engage
and do so in a manner similar to symbolic appropriation.
Paul Farmer describes this dynamic among the descendants of mid-twentieth
century Haiti. In keeping with Estim6's "modernization," while at the same time
returning to a complaisant subservience to American capital, President Paul Magloire
funded a dam in the Artibonite Valley. The purpose of the dam was to provide
electricity for Port-au-Prince, and its construction illustrates the conflict between
modernity/urbanism and peasant proprietorship. The damming of the Artibonite River
flooded a rural Haitian village, which Farmer calls Petit-fond. The inhabitants were
selectively reimbursed and considered monetary concessions to coincide with education
levels. As one resident put it "If you were uneducated, though, you got nothing."1 70
The speaker goes on to imply the peasant reaction with "if it happened nowadays, it
would be different, because our children read and write."1 7 1 Education became a
"weapon of the weak" against a voracious modernity that fed on the peasantry. Overall
resistance to modernity continued to characterize the peasant response to
"development." In describing the damming of the Artibonite "each interviewee has
169 Sidney Mintz, "Men Women and Trade," Comparative Studies in Society and History, v. 13, no. 3,
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spoken of the unfairness of a project that destroys a way of life and offers benefits only
to a faraway Port-au-Prince."1 72 Because modernity often threatened the core of
peasant society (family, land, and religion) it is no surprise that it was not readily
accepted. Were Vodou and peasant proprietorship truly respected rather than trampled
in the march of "progress," the situation would have been different.
172 /bid., p. 26-27.
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The conflict between the state and the masses in their visions of modernity
stretches back throughout Haitian history. The slave system that served as the
foundation to the rise of modern western states was fueled by forced labor, maintained
by oppression and justified through racism. In Haiti this system was destroyed and the
question arose as to how it would enter into modernity. The masses were attached to
the land and their insistence on maintaining these ties put them in direct opposition to
the newly formed Haitian elite. These elite maintained a reverence for the very states
that despised them and attempted to build Haiti according to positivist dictates. In
attempting to reconcile with a world that remained hostile to an independent black
republic the Haitian elite used the toil of the masses to pay an indemnity to France.
This indemnity was directed at compensating former slave owners for their economic
loss in exchange for recognition of Haitian independence. The result was a debilitating
debt, which attracted imperial financiers who continued to build on the debt in an effort
to assert themselves in a financially handicapped Haiti. The economic burdens of Haiti
continued to fall upon the masses who were divorced from the power to confront them
in the legislative sphere. Their circumscription was justified through institutional
racism, which included a linguistic component.
The Haitian people were not complaisant in these events and their resistance
earned them the derision of outside observers. When the masses exercised the power
they did have, that of the machete or the 'Steamroller,' they were characterized as
ignorant, backwards, savages. This detached posturing on the part of Western powers
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was based directly on an adherence to a racial hierarchy with whites at the apex and
served as a justification for their continued interference in Haitian affairs. The most
pronounced instance of racist intervention was the US occupation. The occupation
served to cement both US hegemony and the position of the Haitian elite in opposition
to the masses. Presidents Vincent and Lescot were glaring examples of the disjuncture
between state and nation. The oppression intrinsic to these dictatorships catalyzed the
"revolution of 1946" and the election of Estim6.
Though the position of most Haitians remained one of circumscription, they
retained a certain respect for Estim6. In 1950 Estim6 proposed legislation to alter the
constitution and extend his term of office. The Senate voted against him. The Haitian
public organized demonstrations in order to pressure the Senate to change their stance.
With the public behind him, Estim6 signed a decree to dissolve the Senate, but the
military prevented its publication. The door was opened, and a coup instituted by a
military junta forced Estim6 to resign and seek exile in New York. 73 Estim6 died there
three years later. " 4 Today in Haiti Dumarsais Estim6 is remembered with more
reverence and less revulsion than most Haitian Presidents. This is because of the hope
his term in office presented. Noirisme had brought him to power and within it the
general public perceived the antidote to the class antagonism that inundated the nation.
If blacks and mulattos could unite under the name black then presumably they could be
mutually uplifted. This possibility, which Estim6 had made tangible again, would drive
173 Memorandum by the Director of Middle American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, FR US: 1950, p. 933-34.
17 Abbott, Haiti: An Insider's History. p. 57.
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Haitian politics and result in the election of Francois Duvalier. For the United States
the legacy of Estime was that "racial complications" could pose a threat to hegemony.
Therefore the class chasm was the key to relations with Haiti. A black president need
no longer be feared provided they were amenable to U.S. interests. By no means did
this represent a cleansing of U.S. racism in its relations with Haiti. It was simply a
recognition that the noirisme of the 1940s was not going away and the United States
needed to calculate that into their relations with Haiti.
In 1946 the reinvigorated noirisme of the occupation had emerged in the form of
the Estim6 administration. The ultimate resonance of the Estim6 presidency was that
the Haitian government could not function in opposition to the peasantry. The U.S.
could no longer rely upon the schism between black and mulatto to maintain
hegemony. With this in mind the U.S. government sought to re-establish its hold on
Haiti and deal with the "racial complications" of relations with the nation. SHADA
was re-invigorated under the more favorable government of Paul Magloire, a black
president sympathetic to U.S. interests. The U.S. began to focus on the peasantry
through programs like the International Information and Education Exchange. This
was a program in which American professors were sent to Haiti "for the purpose of
teaching their specialties and imparting to Haitians information about the US."7 5 The
program also entailed "an active press, radio and motion picture program in Haiti."' 7 6
It was a means of attempting to substitute U.S. education for the traditional French
education, and more importantly for the African education stressed by the post-
V Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State, FR US: 195!, p. 1459.
7 Ibid.
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occupation ethnology movement. It was also a means of directly addressing the
increased agency of the Haitian people.
The Haitian population disliked Magloire's policies, which included repression
of political dissidents and the press. In 1956, Magloire was forced to resign and
elections were held. The four primary candidates were Clement Jumelle, Daniel
Fignol6, Loius Dejoie, and Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier. Fignol6 and Duvalier were
both noiristes. Both had served under Estim6, and Duvalier, in particular, recognized
Estim's attractiveness to the Haitian public. Thus, Papa Doc appropriated the legend
of Estim6 in his campaign. Indeed, the noiristes considered Duvalier to be Estim6's
successor. This became more pronounced when he enlisted the support of Estim6's
widow, who accompanied him on his campaigns. His campaign was successful and in
1957 he was elected president.'77
Under Estim6, noirisme had flourished and Haiti sought to re-assert itself as an
independent black republic. In order to do so it had to combat U.S. hegemony, which
had been firmly established since the occupation. The battle for greater Haitian
autonomy was fought along lines of race and economics. When the United States
refused aid to Haiti, the Estim6 administration employed race. This tactic frequently
worked because the U.S. refusal of aid to Haiti was often based on racism. The Estim6
administration also played on U.S. fears of communist insurrection, as well as its own,
to secure loans that were implemented under its own auspices. Estim6 remained
favorable to U.S. capital but refused to allow Americans to use loans as handcuffs. In
17 Abbott, Haiti: An Insider's History. p. 64-5.
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order to reap a profit and secure his position of power, Estime allowed for greater
public expression of black culture, which had been repressed previous to him. All of
this won him support from the Haitian public and opened the door for others such as
Papa Doc to fight "under the banner of Estimisme" 178
The significance of the Estim6 presidency is partially a function of its timing. It
was an answer to the occupation over ten years in the making. Vincent had proved
himself to be an adherent of rather than an opponent to U.S. interests. He aligned
himself in opposition to the people through his maintenance of a private guard and his
weak response to the cane cutter massacre. Lescot was considered Vincent's successor
and acted as such. The polarity between the elite and the masses could not continue in
the same form and Estim6 inherited the presidency from the people thereby breaking
the mulatto dictatorships of the post-occupation period. Estim6 proved himself to be
more socially responsible than his predecessors and those who followed him. Yet it
was in this web of interaction that power was contested. More particularly, it was
within the rhetoric of noirisme as it related to modernity, that the dialogue of the United
States Government, The Haitian elite, and the Haitian people took place.
Duvalier has not yet mutilated noirisme and its potency was very real. It was at
once a recognition of popular agency in governance and a justification for elite
domination. Under Estim6 it was not yet clear to which end noirisme would ultimately
be used. Hence, the U.S., the elite, and the masses battled for the power to define
modernity. Modernity was linked to noirisme in that it was the end to which noirisme
was posited as a means. The United States was put on the defensive as both its
8 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier. p. 209.
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"whitening" corollary to modernity and its power to dictate Haitian governance were
directly challenged. The elite attempted to appropriate blackness to fund urbanization
as a catalyst to modernity. The masses attacked 'tiger cars' and protested in front of the
SHADA building in opposition to a modernity that was more an affliction than a salve.
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